Jamestown Foundation: EURASIA DAILY MONITOR

From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 11/23/2005 11:50 AM
Volume 2, Issue 218 (November 22, 2005)


By Andrei Smirnov

On November 4, the Kabardino-Balkaria branch of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) summoned Ruslan Nakhushov, chairman of the local Islamic Institute, for interrogation. According to Kommersant, Nakhushov visited the FSB the very day that the summons was served. He returned to his office after the interrogation, but somebody called him from the FSB and asked him to return. Nakhushov complied and, after the second visit, called Susanna Varitlova, his deputy, to say that everything was fine and that he would be in his office in 10 minutes. Nobody has seen Nakhushov since. He apparently disappeared, and his cell phone is not working (Kommersant, November 7).

Nakhushov, a former KGB officer who worked in North Africa, became a famous public figure in Kabardino-Balkaria early the 1990s. After the first Chechen war (1994-96) Nakhushov worked for the Peacemaking Mission of Russian General Alexander Lebed. Nakhushov is credited with freeing 180 Russian prisoners-of-war from Chechnya (Kommersant, November 7).

Together with Anzor Astemirov and Musa Mukozhev, Nakhushov organized the Islamic Institute, which seeks to protect the rights of the Muslims in Kabardino-Balkaria. Nakhushov sharply criticized the local security officials’ repressive actions toward the Muslim population. Unlike Astemirov, who became the leader of Yarmuk rebel group, and Mukozhev, who went underground, Nakhushov had always tried to find legal ways to solve problems, and he preferred to negotiate rather than to use violence. After the October 13 attack on Nalchik, the capital of the republic (see EDM, October 15), Nakhushov offered to negotiate between the authorities and the Islamic rebels. Arsen Kanokov, president of Kabardino-Balkaria, planned to meet with Nakhushov to discuss a possible dialogue with the Muslims. In an interview with Novaya gazeta Kanokov called Nakhushov “a candidate for building a bridge to negotiate with young Muslims” (Novaya gazeta, October 31).

Nakhushov’s relatives and friends immediately blamed security officials for his disappearance. “We still hope that he will appear again, but such witnesses are usually not left alive. Ruslan had a lot of information on very sensitive issues about the activities of the special services in Kabardino-Balkaria,” journalist Orkhan Dzhemal told Kavkazsky Uzel (November 7). The law-enforcement agencies did not like Nakhushov’s activity, and his office had been raided several times. On November 11, Nikolai Shepel, the deputy Russian prosecutor-general for the Southern Federal District, hinted that Nakhushov might have gone into hiding because criminal proceedings had been started against him for assisting terrorists. However, Shepel’s words only served to fuel rumors that Nakhushov had been kidnapped by security officials. “He did not plan to hide or to be on the run,” his lawyer insisted (Kavkazsky Uzel, November 11). Regnum news agency sources linked to law-enforcement agencies also believe that Nakhushov was kidnapped by the local FSB (regnum, November 11).

Nakhushov’s disappearance from the Kabardino-Balkaria political scene could stymie the last chance to start a peace process in the region. After the raid on Nalchik, President Kanokov was ready for a dialogue. He made a speech on local television and promised to return the bodies of the rebels and civilians killed in the attack to their relatives. However, he had to change his tone after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Kanokov claims that Putin told him that everything should be done by the book, which in practice meant that no corpses would be returned. Kanokov also obliquely indicated in his television interview that the Russian authorities were very hesitant to build new mosques in Kabardino-Balkaria, saying that they would start the process “very slowly and carefully” (Novaya gazeta, October 31).

The Kremlin and local security officials did not welcome the measures proposed by Kanokov, including a dialogue with the rebels through Nakhushov, opening mosques, and returning the bodies. According to Kommersant, Kanokov has a problem dealing with the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, which directly reports to Moscow. On November 11, a group of Russian politicians, public figures, and human rights activists, including Boris Nadezhdin, a deputy chairman of the Union of the Right Forces political party, held a press conference in Moscow at which they blamed the administration of the Russian president and security officials for the “destabilization in the Caucasian republics.” The group demanded serious changes in Russia’s ethnic minority and religious policies (Kavkazsky Uzel, November 8).

However, the disappearance of Nakhushov and the failure of Kanokov to control the law-enforcement agencies suggest that the policy is unlikely to be significantly altered in the near future.


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Gazeta.ru: Russia’s Young Bolsheviks: An Imitation Of Democracy

From: Eagle_wng

Russia’s Young Bolsheviks: An Imitation Opposition for an Imitation Democracy

Created: 16.08.2005 20:50 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 20:50 MSK > document.write(get_ago(1124211045)); </SCRIPT>


Replacing real institutions with imitations is one of the main aspects of the current presidency in Russia. Surprisingly, this successful approach of running the government is being used both by those working for the current regime and those that oppose it.

By reversing the ruling of a lower court to ban the National Bolshevik Party, the Supreme Court restored the rights not only of Eduard Limonov’s supporters, but of contemporary Russian politics as a whole.

The government’s recent activities aiming to implement a “special” form of democracy that takes into account “Russian nuances” has led to the appearance of all sorts of plaster casts, imitating and replacing authentic public and political life. Instead of the <NOBR>Federation Council</NOBR>, initially created to reflect the opinions of the regions, a certain State Council was set up, the rights and responsibilities of which have still not been articulated. Meanwhile, the upper house of parliament still remains, except that now its functions can’t be readily explained. The transformation of the <NOBR>State Duma</NOBR> into a voting directorate that answers to the executive powers has brought to life the Public Chamber – an organ that appears to have been created to reflect the opinion of various social groups. The implementation of such plaster casts was naturally supposed to affect the life of parties. And that’s where the National Bolsheviks came in.

Today the young Limonov supporters have unknowingly taken on the role of an immitation of a party supposed to oppose <NOBR>President Vladimir Putin</NOBR>’s regime. And that’s because the NBP is the only party that not only talks, but does something too. As best as it can, of course.

Their revolutionary zeal and trappings would make any reasonable person at least somewhat familiar with 20th century history shudder. Their storms of government buildings can also be assessed in different ways. It’s hard to deny that they’re breaking the law, but there’s also no other way to draw attention to the fact that not all is as well in the kingdom of Denmark as it appears on television. No one other than the NBP activists can infiltrate festivities around Putin’s visit to the Zhukov airport and cry out “freedom!”

The NBP work for themselves, and for everyone else. Had there been a real opposition party in Russia that represented the opinion of those that don’t agree with the current regime, the NBP could have remained a small radical sect, as it was at the end of the 1990’s. But as it is, anti-Putin groups can consider themselves to be anything they want – parties, movements, interest clubs – but not real political forces. The popularity of the NBP and the sympathy it has from those people who would otherwise find the words “National Bolshevik” disgusting proves that there is something obviously unhealthy about the current state of Russian politics. Still, it’s all the more difficult to judge the ideological component of the National Bolsheviks.

Their platform has no meaning at all because the party’s mission is, first of all, to protest against the current order.

The party isn’t really interested in anything else: it’s no accident that Eduard Limonov himself announced that he does not want to take part in parliamentary elections.

And here we get an interesting effect: the plaster cast of the opposition is becoming a mirror reflection of the plaster cast of the ruling party. It makes no difference what program <NOBR>United Russia</NOBR> has. The mission of this obviously bureaucratic party is to maintain the status-quo. It neither wants – nor is able to – do anything else. For United Russia, taking part in the Duma elections is not a means to implement its programs, but a way to maintain what today is called stability.

Neither the ruling party, nor the only truly active opposition party have an ideology. They have no articulated aims, and from this standpoint, they compliment each other.

By trying to destroy the plaster cast called NBP, the Moscow District Court disturbed the agreed-upon balance of imitations of a political system. The decision of the Supreme Court reestablishes that balance. Even a plaster-cast democracy needs to live by certain rules.


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RFE/RL Speaks With Ethnographer Emil Pain

From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 10/18/2005 4:09 AM
Russia: RFE/RL Speaks With Ethnographer Emil Pain
Saturday, 15 October 2005
U.S./Russia — Pain, Emil, 12 Oct 05 at Washington briefing
Emil Pain in Washington, D.C., on 12 October
Emil Pain, director of the Russian Center for Ethnopolitical Studies in Moscow, was in Washington on 12 October to participate in a conference on stability in the Caucasus. Much of the discussion foreshadowed the 13 October attacks on multiple targets in Nalchik, capital of the North Caucasus Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. Speaker after speaker predicted another event like the 2004 Beslan school tragedy or the 1995 Budennovsk hospital seizure in the near future.

In his remarks to the conference, Pain recalled how Kabardino-Balkaria just three or four years ago was “one of the safest places in the Russian Federation.” “I like this republic,” he said, “and I often came to Nalchik — it was a really safe place, and now the news from the republic resembles war reporting. Special military operations are carried out in its capital, Nalchik on a regular basis and in the course of such an operations tanks are deployed and elite troops to disarm so-called Wahhabis [in] multi-story apartment buildings.” Pain spoke with RFE/RL correspondent Julie Corwin about the situation in Chechnya and Russian federal policy.

RFE/RL: From your experience as an adviser to former President Boris Yeltsin on Chechnya, how well informed do you think President Vladimir Putin is about what is really going on in Chechnya?

Pain: I wasn’t an adviser specifically on Chechnya but on a broader set of issues. I suppose that the present president is less well informed than the previous one. Why? Because the free press is closed. I know from my personal experience that it was necessary to correct a lot of materials that I received from the secret services. And when I received information from newspapers, I would ask journalists, foreign journalists [about it]. I would sometimes make a big correction in this information war against Chechnya and against [the] Russian audience. This information war has such results that government does not have adequate information.

RFE/RL: Why does Putin seem to have so much faith in [Chechen administration head Akhmed-hadji] Kadyrov?

Pain: Putin trusts him personally. Putin was impressed by the fact that the same person who declared a jihad against the Russian government now wants to serve the Russian government. It made a big impression on him. Of course, it was necessary to calculate a lot of personal factors that brought Kadyrov to this decision. Putin has no other choice, by the way. There are not a lot of other people who could be the Kremlin’s henchman in Chechnya.
“The basis of a civil nation is common goals, common values, trust in the government, and the understanding that the government serves us. The main task of the people [now] is to avoid military service, taxes, and the authorities in general. Under such conditions, it is impossible to form a civil political nation.”

RFE/RL: You were one of first experts in 2002 — and this was even before the Moscow theater hostage crisis — to make the point that Russian military reprisals were counterproductive and simply impel ever more young Chechen men to join the resistance? Do you see a similar situation in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria?

Pain: This was my fundamental position during the first Chechen war [in 1994-96] and I haven’t changed it. I see growing numbers of illegal, informal radical organizations in all the republics of the North Caucasus, and it is a result of this [policy]. It is not only the result of the suppression, but the result of different types of government decisions. It’s a response of the [almost total] alienation of the people from the government.

RFE/RL: Do you still think that it is possible to negotiate and put an end to the fighting in Chechnya? Is there someone who could persuade Putin do this?

Pain: No. I’m against those people who describe the Chechen situation as very simple and all you have to do is to begin negotiations, and the problem will be solved. It couldn’t be solved now. Now it’s a big problem — with whom is it possible to begin negotiations?

RFE/RL: [Chechen resistance leader Abdul-Khalim] Sadullaev is too unpredictable?

Pain: No, but he is not influential enough. And what is most important — the majority of the people in Chechnya hate the terrorists maybe more than the Russian soldiers.

RFE/RL: You said in your presentation that you think Chechnya sets the style for the rest of Kremlin policy toward the regions — i.e., suppression rather than persuasion. Do you predict that other Russian regions outside of the North Caucasus area will become more radicalized?

Pain: We can see even some radicalization in Tatarstan. It’s an indicator that in [the U.S. detention center at] Guantanamo [Bay, Cuba,] there are no Chechens, but there was a Tatar and there were Bashkirs. That’s an indicator.

RFE/RL: Have you seen the new draft concept paper about nationality policy? “Kommersant-Daily” published an article about it and quoted it, saying that one of the primary functions of Russian policy is the “formation of the Russian people [rossiiskii narod] into a single nationality [natsiya]”?

Pain: On the one hand, I strongly support this idea. I don’t know any alternative to the creation of a Russian civil-political nation. But it is a declaration now. And I understand that the real policy is quite against this idea. So it is not enough to produce a slogan, but it is necessary to do something. The basis of a civil nation is common goals, common values, trust in the government, and the understanding that the government serves us. The main task of the people [now] is to avoid military service, taxes, and the authorities in general. Under such conditions, it is impossible to form a civil political nation.

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Insurgents attacked Nalchik arrived to Krasnokamensk town having crossed Moscow

From: eagle_wng
Insurgents attacked Nalchik arrived to Krasnokamensk town  having crossed Moscow
In Krasnokamensk town of Chita area at the night of November, 11th the 2 brothers Kuchmenovs, inhabitants of Shalushka village of Chegensky area of Kabardino-Balkaria involved in the attack at Nalchik on October, 13th were detained. They, according to mass-media, have been already giving confessional indications. They were incriminated terrorism, attempt at lives of employees of the law enforcement bodies, gangsterism, and other heavy crimes of the Criminal code of the Russian Federation.

Under the version of the investigators, 25-years-old Aslan and 27-years-old Ruslan Kuchmenov were members of a gang of 9 criminals who attacked a weapon shop in Nalchik. During the attack they shot several employees of the law enforcement bodies, and fired at several cars. There were four brothers Kuchmenovs. One of them was killed in Nalchik during a firing. Another one had gone abroad and now is in search.

After the attack Aslan and Ruslan Kuchmenovs hid their weapon in a hiding place in a wood near Shalushka village. After that they by auto-stop reached Pyatigorsk town, then by train with changes – up to Moscow. Moscow they left by train to Chita city, and from there – to Krasnokamensk town where arrived on October, 30th. There their faces were identified by the employees of the local department on struggle against organized criminality and the center on struggle against terrorism of the Southern federal district. The special group of militia participated in the operation on detention of the insurgents, NEWSru.com reported.

Why Kuchmerovs decided to hide in Krasnokamensk town, yet it is not clear.



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كفكاز سنتر: قاديروف و زكاييف يؤكدان الإتصالات بينهما

قاديروف و زكاييف يؤكدان الإتصالات بينهما

فترة الاصدار: 11 فبراير 2009, 20:18


كرر زعيم المرتدين الشيشان قاديروف في مقابلته مع الصحافة الروسية الروسية بأن وزير الخارجية السابق لجمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية أحمد زكاييف يمكنه أن يعود بسلام و “يفيد الشعب الشيشاني”.

وفقا لقاديروف, إتصل زكاييف بنفسه به بإقتراح عودته “بجمع جميع من في أوروبا”.

قال قاديروف: “زكاييف ممثل مسرحي قدير و رجل مثقف جدا”.

نذكر أنه سابقا كرر قاديروف عرضه على زكاييف “بأن يعود للشيشان و يفيد الشعب الشيشاني”.

وفقا لقاديروف, “يجب على زكاييف أن يتجاوز نفسه” من أجل أن يعود, “لأنه خائف إذا كان هناك حرب, فهناك ذنوب كذلك”.

و أشار قاديروف بأنه عاد سابقا من أوروبا إثنين من ممثلي رئيس جمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية – عمر ساجيبوف و عمر خانباييف, الذين “عندما عادا وجدا أنه لم منعهما أحد من الصلاة, و بناء المساجد, و قيادة الحياة المدنية”.

و قال قاديروف: “الناس وفضوا المسلحين. إنهم جميعا يتجادلون مع بعضهم البعض – و عمروف, يودوغوف, و زكاييف يخافون من بعضهم البعض أكثر من الحكومة الروسية. زكاييف يريد أن يعود, لقد تكلمت معه. لقد قال لي: أريد أن أكون مفيدا أكثر”.

و أضاف قاديروف أنه يتوقع قريبا بيانا رسميا من والد موفسار باراييف.

قال قاديروف: “والده الآن في الخارج. الآن سيقول بالرغم من أنه سيقول أنه فقد كل شيء بسبب الحرب, و لكنه سيرفع يديه و يسأل: عفوا, أنا مع روسيا”. أنا متأكد من ذلك, لأنه قال منذ شهر أمام شعبه”.

نذكر انه منذ أبريل 2008م يجري زكاييف مفاوضان نشطة مع قاديروف, عندما تحدث حسن باييف, الذي أضيف بشكل مجهول في “حكومة زكاييف التلفونية”, مع قاديروف نيابة عن وزير الخارجية السابق لجمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية.

عندها, إستمرت المفاوضات من خلال المغني تيمور موتسوراييف. بعدها دخل الإخوة خانباييف في المفاوضات مع زكاييف. و غادر الممثل الشخصي لزكاييف – ياراغي عبداللهييف إلى الشيشان, وفقا لبعض المصادر, للإعداد للقاء.

شقيق زكاييف بوفادي زكاييف الذي يعيش في جورجيا, إلتقى بقاديروف كذلك. بعد العودة للشيشان قابل بوفادي زكاييف مع اللاجئين الشيشان في بانكيسي, و دعاهم للعودة للديار بأمان من قاديروف.

و نذكر كذلك بأنه في أحد تصريحاته الأخيرة قال أحمد زكاييف بأن يرغب في التفاوض مع قاديروف.

مع ذلك, ليس  واضحا إذا كان زكاييف سيعود للشيشان. وفقا للدائرة التي يجمعها زكاييف حوله بأنه سيصبح الممثل الشخصي لقاديروف في الغرب.

بينما, زكاييف نفسه أكد في مقابلة مع البي بي سي حقيقة الإتصال مع قاديرورف, ولكن نفى المعلومات بأنه ناقش معه “ظروف العودته”.

وضح زكاييف: “ليست أول مرة يقول رمضان قاديروف مثل ذلك التصريح. لم أناقش أبدا معه أية وعود من جانبي أو ظروف عودتي”.

إضافة إلى ذلك, قال فجأة بأن بوتن عرض عليه أن يحل مكان قاديروف كزعيم لمرتدي الشيشان.

“أستطيع أن أقول لك بأن رمضان قاديروف ليس الوحيد المهتم بوضعي الوظيفي. أرسل بوتن إلي ممثله و عرض علي حتى وظيفة رمضان قاديروف الحالية. أعربت عن إمتناني – أستطيع الآن أن أبدي إمتناني بأولئك المهتمين بمصيري – ولكن موقفي يختلف أساسا من موقف أولئك الذين يأتمنون أنفسهم اليوم للقيادة الروسية”.

و أعلن وزير الخارجية السابق لجمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية بانه “مخول من البرلمان” و إدعى بأنه سيصبح “رئيس حكومة جمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية”.

نذكر بأن ما يسمى “بالحكومة التلفونية” التي يترأسها زكاييف التي أعلنها زكايف نفسه في لندن بعد إعلان إمارة القوقاز. و أشار وزير الخارجية السابق لجمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية بأنه تم إختياره عن طريق “التصويت الهاتفي”. تبين فيما بعد بأن خمسة من الأعضاء السابقين في البرلمان الذي حله دوكو عمروف, كانوا متواجدين في “التصويت الهاتفي”.

و سمى رئيس اللجنة البرلمانية للشؤون الخارجية لجمهورية إيشكريا الشيشانية, في ذلك الوقت, أخياد إيديغوف تلك الخدعة “تعيينا” لزكاييف.

بينما, في مقابلته مع البي بي سي أشار زكاييف بأنه “منفتح للحوار” مع قاديروف من أجل إيجاد “صيغة سياسية للوجود الروسي”.

قال زكاييف بأنه غير مستعد لقبول أي مناصب في الشيشان, لأن “ذلك سيكون غباء جدا”.

إنه يرجوا بأنه “عاجلا أو آجلا سيكون هناك قوة في روسيا ستكون مهتمة بحل لهذا النزاع. عندها سيكون هناك حاجة لكل أولئك الذين يستمرون اليوم بالإصرار على البحث عن حلا سلميا للنزاع الروسي الشيشاني”.

و نفى زكاييف بأنه إتهامات FSB “يشكل وحدات مسلحة في الشيشان” و أشار بأن تشكيلها “ليس في مصلحتنا”, و ذلك “سخافة, لأننا نفهم بأن النزاع ليس له حل عسكري”.

و أوضح زكاييف بأنه يخشى العودة للديار, حيث يخشى من الإعتقال.

“حول ما هي الظروف التي سأعود فيها للشيشان, سيعلن عن ذلك بانه عملية ناجحة بإعتقال إرهابي دولي” و أشار زكاييف بأنه نصح العميل بالوراثة قاديروف “بعدم تصديق FSB”.

كفكاز سنتر


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The Economist: Mass Murder And The Market

Ex-communist reform

Mass murder and the market

Jan 22nd 2009
From The Economist print edition

Economic reform in Russia was accompanied by millions of early deaths. But it was not the cause

MATCHES and even salt were in short supply as the Soviet empire’s planned economies collapsed two decades ago. But blame was plentiful then and now. Millions of people—chiefly men in late middle age—died earlier than their counterparts in other countries. That drop, of fully five years in male life expectancy between 1991 and 1994, demands explanation. A newly published article in the Lancet, a British medical journal that in recent years has used epidemiological analysis to examine political and social questions, argues that the clear culprit was mass privatisation (distributing vouchers that could be swapped for shares in state-owned enterprises). A statistical analysis, it says, shows that this element of the economic-reform package, nicknamed “shock therapy”, clearly correlates with higher mortality rates.

That, says the Lancet, was a shocking failure. It argues that advocates of free-market economics (it cites an article in this newspaper by the economist Jeffrey Sachs) ignored the human costs of the policies they were promoting. These included unemployment and human misery, leading to early death. In effect, mass privatisation was mass murder. Had Russia adopted more gradual reforms, those lives would have been saved.

In fact the blame game must start at the beginning. Why was the Soviet economy in ruins by 1991? Partly because planned economies don’t work (blame Lenin and Stalin for that). Partly because the gerontocratic leadership of Leonid Brezhnev failed to start reforms in the early 1970s, when gradualism might have had a chance of succeeding. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev initiated perestroika and glasnost in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was all but bust. Worse, by running the printing presses red-hot, his government created a colossal monetary overhang. Russians may have thought that their savings evaporated when prices were liberalised at the start of 1992; in truth, their cash was already worthless.

Surgical alcohol

The second question is the effect of all this on mortality. Soviet public-health statistics show a clear decline from 1965 to the early 1980s, with rising deaths from circulatory diseases (because of poor diet, smoking and, especially, drinking). Mr Gorbachev’s anti-booze campaign—although hugely unpopular—raised life expectancy by fully three years between 1985 and 1987. After 1992 the state monopoly on alcohol (and health checks on its quality) collapsed. As anybody who lived in Russia at the time will recall, the effect was spectacular—and catastrophic. Death rates returned to their long-term trend.

The thorniest question is about economic policy mistakes after 1991. In retrospect, the West failed to prepare for the Soviet collapse. It took too long to recognise that Boris Yeltsin’s first government deserved trust, pressing it too hard on debt repayments and being too stingy with aid. Then it made the opposite mistake, being too trusting and generous when Russia was becoming more hawkish and looting was endemic. Mass privatisation broke the planners’ grip but failed to create the hoped-for shareholder democracy.

Yet the Lancet paper seriously misunderstands both the timing and the effects of economic reform. It states quite wrongly that “Russia fully implemented shock therapy by 1994”. As it happens, in that year life expectancy started rising. But in any case reforms were by then bogged down and advisers such as Mr Sachs had quit in despair. Moreover, mass privatisation had little immediate effect on jobs—or much else. Most Russians exchanged their vouchers for trivial amounts of cash, or even vodka. That may have been marginally bad for their health—but it does not explain the huge jump in the death rate.

Correlation is not causation. Mass privatisation was not the most important or effective part of “shock therapy” and the rise in death rates is out of synch with efforts at economic reform. Furthermore, countries that successfully applied shock therapy, such as Poland, saw improved life expectancy. So did the then Czechoslovakia, which plumped for mass privatisation, albeit not very successfully. Mistakes were made, but Russia’s tragedy was that reform came too slowly, not too fast.


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February, 12th 2009


Official Information Section, SNA CHECHENPRESS, February, 8th 2009.

The ChRI Parliament Press Service reports that a joint extended session of the Parliament and the ChRI Cabinet of Ministers took place in Brussels on 708 February. It heard the annual report by the Chairman of the ChRI Government Akhmed Zakaev for 2008. The participants also discussed the main areas of joint activity by the ChRI Parliament and Cabinet of Ministers in 2009 and took decisions on issues of strategic importance for the domestic and foreign policy of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya.


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