Wikileaks: Viewing Cable 08ANKARA1635, TURKISH CAUCASIANS’ INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL POLICY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA1635 2008-09-11 14:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001635

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RU TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH CAUCASIANS’ INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL POLICY

REF: ANKARA 1062

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  The conflict in Georgia has

mobilized a large portion of Turkey’s ethnic Caucasian

community to lobby Ankara to join Moscow in recognizing

Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence.  As during the

Chechen wars of the 1990s, ethnic Caucasian groups will force

the GOT to walk a fine line between supporting the

territorial integrity of a neighbor, in this case Georgia,

and engaging breakaway regions with which a large number of

Turks feel strong cultural and historical bonds.  Turkish

Caucasians are divided between “North Caucasian,” or

“Circassian,” groups, e.g., Abkhaz, Chechen, Ossetian, and

“South Caucasian,” or “Georgian,” groups — segments once

allied in their anti-Soviet and then anti-Russian

orientation.  The Circassian lobby is organized and

politically active, though weakened somewhat by growing rifts

between Circassian groups that fear Russia’s long-term

intentions to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and those

that favor greater cooperation with Russia, largely for

business reasons.  In contrast, Turkey’s ethnic Georgians

have struggled to constitute an effective lobby.  Mostly from

the Ajara region of Georgia, and fewer in number than the

Circassians, Turkey’s Georgians are defined more by their

Muslim identity than their ethnicity.  They complain about

Georgian President Saakashvili encroaching upon Ajaran

autonomy.  As a result, most, but not all, Turkish Georgians

have limited sympathy for Saakashvili, even as they voice

their solidarity with the Georgian people.

2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT’D:  Despite pressure from

Turkish Circassians, the GOT will not break from its Western

allies to recognize Abkhaz or South Ossetian independence.

GOT support for Georgia’s territorial integrity is strong and

based on self-interest:  adherence to the principle of

territorial integrity underscores Turkey’s own political

unity.  Moreover, it is in Turkey’s interest to support a

strong, united Georgia if Turkey is to avoid one day

bordering Russia directly — a centuries-old experience it

does not wish to relive.  Under pressure from Turkish

Circassians and wishing to forestall a formal annexation of

Abkhazia by Russia (effectively doubling Russia’s Black Sea

coastline), the GOT may seek to engage Abkhazia more robustly

in the months and years ahead through trade and investment,

transportation links, and unofficial contacts with the de

facto government in Sukhumi.  Ankara will likely seek to

persuade Tbilisi of the wisdom of this approach, but may

prove undeterred if Tbilisi continues to oppose such

measures, as it did, to Ankara’s regret, before this latest

conflict.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

CAUCASIANS IN TURKEY

——————–

3. (SBU) Estimates of the Caucasian population in Turkey vary

but range to as high as seven million.  Apart from Turkey’s

recognized Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities, Turkish

censuses do not investigate ethnicity, making an accurate

count difficult.  However, TOBB University International

Relations Department Professor and Caucasus expert Mitat

Celikpala, in his paper, “From Immigrants to Diaspora:

Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey,” notes

that in the 1965 census, Turks were asked about their primary

or secondary language.  About 119,000 (four percent of the

population at the time) responded Abkhazian or related North

Caucasian languages — an impressive amount given that the

majority of immigration from that region to Turkey took place

in the mid-to-late 19th century.  A smaller number of

respondents indicated they spoke Georgian.  Based on those

responses, and recognizing that a majority of Circassian

Turks would have integrated and lost the ability to speak

their native languages by 1965, Celikpala estimates the

Turkish Caucasian population today to be about 3.5 million,

but the extent to which these peoples self-identify as

Caucasian (or Abkhaz or Ossetian or Georgian) varies.  In

contrast to the Armenian diaspora in the United States, for

example, the Turkish Caucasian diaspora is far more diffuse.

4. (U) Turkish Caucasians are divided into two main groups:

North Caucasian and South Caucasian.  North Caucasians

descend from the Caucasian territories of present-day Russia,

i.e., Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingusetia etc., as well as from

ANKARA 00001635  002 OF 005

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  This group is commonly known in

Turkey as Circassian, and the largest sub-group among the

Circassians are the Abkhaz.  (Ossetians are known in Turkey

as Kusha and constitute a far smaller community.)  In the

Turkish context, South Caucasian generally refers to

Georgians and related ethnicities, such as Laz and

Mingrelian.  (Other South Caucasians in Turkey are distinct:

Armenians are a recognized minority and Azeris linguistically

and ethnically are Turkic.)

CIRCASSIANS

———–

5. (SBU) Turkish Circassians’ ancestors were forced to leave

their North Caucasian homelands as Russia completed the

annexation of the region in the second half of the 19th

century.  Celikpala estimates that over 1.5 million emigrated

— about 90 percent of the North Caucasian population at the

time.  They settled largely in the Ottoman Empire, in present

day Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Balkans, but mostly in

Anatolia.  A second, smaller wave of emigration to Turkey

took place in 1918, as the Bolsheviks re-consolidated Russian

power in the region.  Finally, the GOT permitted about 600

North Caucasian legionnaires to settle in Turkey after World

War II.  Circassians in Anatolia settled primarily in the

Marmara region around Adapazari, moving to villages based on

their respective sub-identity, i.e., Abkhaz, Ossetian, etc.,

though these sub-groups, as well as the Georgians who came to

live among them, interacted and intermarried.  Anatolia’s

rural isolation helped ensure that Circassian culture and

language persevered well into the 20th century.

6. (SBU) Turkish Circassians quickly gained a reputation for

loyalty to their new country, and are still known today for

their nationalistic character (as are Georgians).  Yet they

retained a strong Circassian cultural identity which they

channeled into political activism against Russian

“occupation” in the Caucasus.  However, the need for the new

Turkish Republic to cooperate with the Bolshevik regime in

the early days of Turkish independence, and the subsequent

pan-Turkism introduced by Ataturk as a key element of Turkish

nation building, curbed Circassian political activism until

the outset of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union became

defined as an enemy of Turkey.  With the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, Turkish Circassians, with the tacit approval of

Ankara, emerged as a key support base for Chechen separatists

in their 1990s wars against Russia, much to the annoyance of

Moscow.  Turkey’s overall support for the Chechen insurgency

faded, however, as the insurgency became associated

increasingly with terrorism.  Chechnya remains, nonetheless,

a passionate issue for many Turkish Circassians.

7. (C) Numerous groups are active in the Circassian lobby

today, but two stand out:  The Caucasus Association (KAF-DER)

and the Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (KADK).

KAF-DER (kaf-der.org.tr) is led by Cihan Candemir, board

member of Turkish construction giant Yuksel Insaat.  KADK

(abhazya.org), and a related, ad-hoc group known as the

“Friends of Abkhazia,” are led by Irfan Argun.  The

Istanbul-based Caucasus Foundation (www.kafkas.org.tr) is

instrumental in fundraising for Caucasus causes.  KADK could

be described as Abkhazia’s unofficial representation in

Turkey, though both Argun and Candemir maintain close ties to

Sukhumi, in particular with one Turkish-born Abkhaz

“parliamentarian,” Sener Gogua, who visits Turkey frequently

and told us he coordinates diaspora affairs for “President”

Bagapsh (reftel).  KADK and KAF-DER are both members of the

Federation for Caucasus Associations (kafkasfederasyonu.org),

an umbrella organization for Circassian NGOSs, also led by

Candemir.  But Argun and Candemir do not see eye-to-eye

completely.  KADK, Celikpala explained, welcomed Russia’s

recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, but is

concerned about Russian annexation of Abkhazia (South Ossetia

increasingly being seen as a lost cause).  Argun’s allies

continue to advocate for the rights of Caucasians in Russia

proper, including Chechens.  (KADK shares roots with the

Caucasian-Chechen Solidarity Committee, which played a

similar role in Turkey vis a vis Chechnya.)  Candemir pays

lip service to the same concerns about Russia, but has

reportedly developed close ties to the Russian Embassy in

Ankara and thus more reticent to criticize Moscow.  Yuksel

Insaat has extensive business interests throughout Russia and

the former Soviet Union; Candemir has, according to

Celikpala, used his KAF-DER and Federation leadership to

ANKARA 00001635  003 OF 005

cultivate ties on behalf of his company.  The upcoming 2014

Sochi Winter Olympic Games promise to be a boon for Yuksel

and other leading Turkish construction firms.  (NOTE:

Turkish MFA estimates that Turkish construction contracts in

Russia are worth $30 billion; $6 billion having been added

last year alone.  END NOTE.)

GEORGIANS

———

8.  (SBU) Turkish Georgians are primarily of Ajaran descent.

Being Muslim, they moved to or preferred to stay in Turkey

when the Soviet Union and Turkey formally delimited their

border in 1921.  Some Turks descending from Georgia claim an

Ahiska Turkish identity, allowing them to more easily

assimilate within Turkish society as Turks.  (NOTE:  The

Ahiska or Meskhetian Turks are ethnic Turks from present-day

Georgia who were deported by Stalin to Central Asia and are

now campaigning, with Ankara’s support, for the right to

return to their homeland.  END NOTE.)

9. (C) Georgian cultural identity is weaker (and Islamic

identity stronger) than for Circassians, and Georgians are

less active politically.  While not activists, Bilkent

University Professor Hasan Ali Karasar points out that

Georgians have retained important economic and political

influence in Turkey, primarily in the Black Sea region, but

also in Ankara (the Forest Ministry, for example, is

historically led by a Georgian, Karasar told us) and

Istanbul, where many have emigrated.  A number of key

political leaders, including PM Erdogan and nationalist

Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal are

reported to be of Georgian descent, though it is unclear how

much, if at all, they are influenced by their heritage;

neither would welcome any non-Turkish definitions of their

identity.  The Turkey-Georgia Inter-Parliamentary Friendship

Group has twenty members representing all three main parties

in Parliament.

10. (C) Turkish Georgians retain strong ties to Batumi,

viewing the eastern Black Sea region and Ajara as an

integrated whole.  Turkish Georgians have invested greatly in

Batumi and welcome GOT efforts to promote regional economic

integration with Georgia.  But they have complained about

Tbilisi’s alleged efforts to curtail Ajaran autonomy, of

which Turkey is a legal guarantor, they argue.  They also

complain about Georgian chauvinism.  Turkish Georgians

criticized, for example, the decision to insert a Georgian

cross in the Ajaran flag following Saakashvili’s successful

efforts to consolidate Ajara within Georgia (sending

then-Ajaran leader Abashidze fleeing via Trabzon).  Maps of

“Greater Georgia” that occasionally emerge from Georgia

showing the Eastern Turkish province of Artvin as part of

Georgia raise eyebrows here.  Turkish Georgians are also

watching closely for Tbilisi’s support for the repatriation

of the Ahiska Turks.

11. (C) While Saakashvili has not helped himself with Turkish

Georgians through his actions in Ajara, Tbilisi has

cultivated useful ties with some Turkish Georgian groups.

The oldest and principle Turkish-Georgian language newspaper

in Turkey, “Chveneburi,” (chveneburi.net) is decidedly

pro-Saakashvili in its coverage.  Acar Insaat, a large

Turkish construction firm, has close connections with the

Saakashvili administration, according to Celikpala.  A number

of other large holding groups in Turkey are run by ethnic

Georgians, including the Carmikli and Ozaltin groups, and

also maintain ties with Tbilisi.  In the 1990s, with GOG

support, Turkish and Georgian businessmen founded the

Turkish-Georgian Cultural and Solidarity Foundation in an

effort to balance the Abkhaz/Circassian lobby.  Additional

foundations and associations were created, but have never

competed effectively with the Circassians.  But the Russian

invasion of Georgia prompted, according to Karasar, the

first-ever street protests organized by Turkish Georgians, in

Ankara and Istanbul.  This may signal greater Georgian

political activism in the future, but it will be difficult

for Georgians to overcome their dislike for Saakashvili, even

as they express their solidarity with the Georgian people.

Turkish Georgians’ cultural awareness has been enhanced in

recent years through efforts by the Georgian Embassy in

Ankara and local governments in northeastern Turkey to

promote Turkey’s Georgian heritage, including hundreds of

churches, as a tourist attraction.

ANKARA 00001635  004 OF 005

HOW WILL TURKISH CAUCASIANS SHAPE GOT POLICY?

———————————————

12. (C) Turkey will not break ranks with its Western allies

to recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia.  Circassian voters

are an important nationalist vote base, but as nationalist

National Action Party (MHP) Vice Chairman Vural Oktay told

us, “Turkey comes first.”  While pragmatic on Kosovo (a

testament to the strength of ethnic lobbies in Turkey;

Kosovar Turks campaigned strongly for Kosovo’s independence),

adherence to the principle of territorial integrity

underscores Turkey’s own political unity, namely with regards

to the Kurdish question, ensuring Turkey acts carefully.  The

Turks will also not wish to take any action that destabilizes

Georgia.  Georgia is a buffer between Russia and Turkey; the

Turks have no interest in once again bordering Russia, with

whom they fought 13 wars over the centuries.

13. (C) At the same time, the GOT will be under considerable

pressure from the Circassian lobby.  While diffuse and

factionalized, the lobby includes a number of well-placed,

influential businesspeople and former high-level bureaucrats

who will urge the GOT to alter its policy of non-engagement

with Abkhazia.  These groups have argued that Turkey’s

“unilateral,” pro-Tbilisi policies have ignored the plight of

peoples living in the region, re-subjecting them to Russian

domination.  Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM)

Senior Researcher Hasan Kanbolat underscored the Turkish

Circassian view that Abkhazia desires a Western orientation

and that Turkish engagement with Abkhazia (if not

recognition) is essential to forestalling Russian annexation

of Abkhazia.  At the urging of Tbilisi, Ankara has avoided

direct engagement with Sukhumi, leaning on Circassian NGOs to

cancel two “unofficial” visits by Bagapsh (though a visit by

“FM” Shamba took place  in June 2008) and holding back its

proposal to link Sukhumi to Trabzon by ferry.  The GOT has

long complained to us privately about Georgia’s opposition to

even limited engagement with Abkhazia and may no longer be

persuaded by the Georgian argument that any unofficial

engagement would constitute de facto recognition.  As we have

learned through our contacts with Turkish Circassian groups,

some Turkish businessmen are already traveling to and

planning to invest in Abkhazia.

14. (SBU) Criticism of Turkish “unilateral” policy in the

Caucasus has resonated beyond the Circassian lobby.  As

evidenced by public support for Turkish-Armenian

rapprochement, Turks favor dialogue as a means to solve

problems.  Turkish analysts have argued that Turkey has

wasted opportunities to prevent this latest conflict by not

exercising its historic and cultural linkages with the

peoples of the Caucasus.  Karasar, for example, has argued

that, in addition to normalizing relations with Armenia,

Turkey should seek dialogue with all parties in the region.

It should channel humanitarian aid to the separatist enclaves

of Georgia while investing heavily in Georgia’s

reconstruction.  It should accept refugees from Georgia’s

war-torn regions, and establish direct economic relations

with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including establishing a

flight between Sukhumi and Istanbul.  He further advises that

Turkey expand existing scholarship programs for Caucasians

from across the region with an eye to shaping the region’s

democratic future.  Karasar has endorsed Turkey’s Caucasus

Stability and Cooperation Platform concept, but predicts the

platform will fail if it does not offer a seat at the table

to all peoples represented in conflict areas, including

Abkhazians, Ossetians, and even Nagorno-Karabakhians.

RUSSIA AND THE CHECHNYA EXPERIENCE

———————————-

15. (C) The extent to which Russia would support enhanced

Turkish engagement with Abkhazia and other separatist

enclaves in the Caucasus is unclear.  The GOT believes

Russians harbor lingering historical doubts about Turkey’s

intentions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and will be wary

to lose influence to pro-Western, NATO-member Turkey.  In the

meantime, Russia will likely continue playing the Circassian

card to foster division between Turkey and Georgia and seek

to exploit the sympathies most Turks have for the Abkhaz in

the conflict with Georgia.  Russia witnessed first hand

Circassian influence in Turkey during the 1990s when Turkey

tacitly sided with the Chechens in their separatist war

against Russia, making “unofficial” contacts with Chechen

ANKARA 00001635  005 OF 005

leaders, allowing the Chechens to establish unofficial

representation in Istanbul, permitting Chechen insurgents to

move freely within Turkey, and funneling humanitarian aid to

Chechnya over Russian complaints the aid was cover for

weapons shipments.  In 1991, four Chechens, including Shamil

Basayev, hijacked a Russian plane and flew it to Ankara to

highlight their cause.  The Turks refused the hijackers a

press conference, but allowed them to return to Chechnya

despite Russian demands for their arrest.  Overall Turkish

support for the Chechen cause waned eventually as the

insurgency became increasingly associated with terrorism;

Abkhazia is now the cause celebre for Turkish Circassians.

CIRCASSIANS AND CYPRUS

———————-

16. (C) Turkish Circassians point to Turkey’s recognition of

an independent “TRNC” as justification for Turkish

recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The Russians too

have invoked northern Cyprus as a precedent.  Russia argued

the West paved the way for widespread recognition of the

“TRNC” by recognizing Kosovo’s independence.  Later, Russia’s

Ambassador in Ankara reportedly proposed a convenient

quid-pro-quo to Turkey, suggesting Russian “TRNC” recognition

in exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia.  The Turks have not accepted this thinking, and do

not trust Russia on Cyprus.  Moscow is perceived in Ankara as

pro-Greek Cypriot, whereas Moscow has traditionally viewed

the “TRNC” as a base of support for Caucasian separatism.

(NOTE:  Then-Chechen “President” Dudayev held the “TRNC” up

as a model for Chechnya during his first “official” visit

abroad to Turkey and the “TRNC” in 1992, where he met with

then-“TRNC” “President” Denktash.  END NOTE.)  Turkey,

despite its recognition of the “TRNC,” supports the

reunification of Cyprus as a bicommunal federation.  Turkey

has urged the international community to end the isolation of

northern Cypriots but has never lobbied the international

community strongly on formal “TRNC” recognition.

Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA1635 2008-09-11 14:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO0713

PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR

DE RUEHAK #1635/01 2551425

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 111425Z SEP 08

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7438

INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY

RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001635

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RU TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH CAUCASIANS’ INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL POLICY

REF: ANKARA 1062

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  The conflict in Georgia has

mobilized a large portion of Turkey’s ethnic Caucasian

community to lobby Ankara to join Moscow in recognizing

Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence.  As during the

Chechen wars of the 1990s, ethnic Caucasian groups will force

the GOT to walk a fine line between supporting the

territorial integrity of a neighbor, in this case Georgia,

and engaging breakaway regions with which a large number of

Turks feel strong cultural and historical bonds.  Turkish

Caucasians are divided between “North Caucasian,” or

“Circassian,” groups, e.g., Abkhaz, Chechen, Ossetian, and

“South Caucasian,” or “Georgian,” groups — segments once

allied in their anti-Soviet and then anti-Russian

orientation.  The Circassian lobby is organized and

politically active, though weakened somewhat by growing rifts

between Circassian groups that fear Russia’s long-term

intentions to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and those

that favor greater cooperation with Russia, largely for

business reasons.  In contrast, Turkey’s ethnic Georgians

have struggled to constitute an effective lobby.  Mostly from

the Ajara region of Georgia, and fewer in number than the

Circassians, Turkey’s Georgians are defined more by their

Muslim identity than their ethnicity.  They complain about

Georgian President Saakashvili encroaching upon Ajaran

autonomy.  As a result, most, but not all, Turkish Georgians

have limited sympathy for Saakashvili, even as they voice

their solidarity with the Georgian people.

2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT’D:  Despite pressure from

Turkish Circassians, the GOT will not break from its Western

allies to recognize Abkhaz or South Ossetian independence.

GOT support for Georgia’s territorial integrity is strong and

based on self-interest:  adherence to the principle of

territorial integrity underscores Turkey’s own political

unity.  Moreover, it is in Turkey’s interest to support a

strong, united Georgia if Turkey is to avoid one day

bordering Russia directly — a centuries-old experience it

does not wish to relive.  Under pressure from Turkish

Circassians and wishing to forestall a formal annexation of

Abkhazia by Russia (effectively doubling Russia’s Black Sea

coastline), the GOT may seek to engage Abkhazia more robustly

in the months and years ahead through trade and investment,

transportation links, and unofficial contacts with the de

facto government in Sukhumi.  Ankara will likely seek to

persuade Tbilisi of the wisdom of this approach, but may

prove undeterred if Tbilisi continues to oppose such

measures, as it did, to Ankara’s regret, before this latest

conflict.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

CAUCASIANS IN TURKEY

——————–

3. (SBU) Estimates of the Caucasian population in Turkey vary

but range to as high as seven million.  Apart from Turkey’s

recognized Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities, Turkish

censuses do not investigate ethnicity, making an accurate

count difficult.  However, TOBB University International

Relations Department Professor and Caucasus expert Mitat

Celikpala, in his paper, “From Immigrants to Diaspora:

Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey,” notes

that in the 1965 census, Turks were asked about their primary

or secondary language.  About 119,000 (four percent of the

population at the time) responded Abkhazian or related North

Caucasian languages — an impressive amount given that the

majority of immigration from that region to Turkey took place

in the mid-to-late 19th century.  A smaller number of

respondents indicated they spoke Georgian.  Based on those

responses, and recognizing that a majority of Circassian

Turks would have integrated and lost the ability to speak

their native languages by 1965, Celikpala estimates the

Turkish Caucasian population today to be about 3.5 million,

but the extent to which these peoples self-identify as

Caucasian (or Abkhaz or Ossetian or Georgian) varies.  In

contrast to the Armenian diaspora in the United States, for

example, the Turkish Caucasian diaspora is far more diffuse.

4. (U) Turkish Caucasians are divided into two main groups:

North Caucasian and South Caucasian.  North Caucasians

descend from the Caucasian territories of present-day Russia,

i.e., Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingusetia etc., as well as from

ANKARA 00001635  002 OF 005

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  This group is commonly known in

Turkey as Circassian, and the largest sub-group among the

Circassians are the Abkhaz.  (Ossetians are known in Turkey

as Kusha and constitute a far smaller community.)  In the

Turkish context, South Caucasian generally refers to

Georgians and related ethnicities, such as Laz and

Mingrelian.  (Other South Caucasians in Turkey are distinct:

Armenians are a recognized minority and Azeris linguistically

and ethnically are Turkic.)

CIRCASSIANS

———–

5. (SBU) Turkish Circassians’ ancestors were forced to leave

their North Caucasian homelands as Russia completed the

annexation of the region in the second half of the 19th

century.  Celikpala estimates that over 1.5 million emigrated

— about 90 percent of the North Caucasian population at the

time.  They settled largely in the Ottoman Empire, in present

day Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Balkans, but mostly in

Anatolia.  A second, smaller wave of emigration to Turkey

took place in 1918, as the Bolsheviks re-consolidated Russian

power in the region.  Finally, the GOT permitted about 600

North Caucasian legionnaires to settle in Turkey after World

War II.  Circassians in Anatolia settled primarily in the

Marmara region around Adapazari, moving to villages based on

their respective sub-identity, i.e., Abkhaz, Ossetian, etc.,

though these sub-groups, as well as the Georgians who came to

live among them, interacted and intermarried.  Anatolia’s

rural isolation helped ensure that Circassian culture and

language persevered well into the 20th century.

6. (SBU) Turkish Circassians quickly gained a reputation for

loyalty to their new country, and are still known today for

their nationalistic character (as are Georgians).  Yet they

retained a strong Circassian cultural identity which they

channeled into political activism against Russian

“occupation” in the Caucasus.  However, the need for the new

Turkish Republic to cooperate with the Bolshevik regime in

the early days of Turkish independence, and the subsequent

pan-Turkism introduced by Ataturk as a key element of Turkish

nation building, curbed Circassian political activism until

the outset of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union became

defined as an enemy of Turkey.  With the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, Turkish Circassians, with the tacit approval of

Ankara, emerged as a key support base for Chechen separatists

in their 1990s wars against Russia, much to the annoyance of

Moscow.  Turkey’s overall support for the Chechen insurgency

faded, however, as the insurgency became associated

increasingly with terrorism.  Chechnya remains, nonetheless,

a passionate issue for many Turkish Circassians.

7. (C) Numerous groups are active in the Circassian lobby

today, but two stand out:  The Caucasus Association (KAF-DER)

and the Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (KADK).

KAF-DER (kaf-der.org.tr) is led by Cihan Candemir, board

member of Turkish construction giant Yuksel Insaat.  KADK

(abhazya.org), and a related, ad-hoc group known as the

“Friends of Abkhazia,” are led by Irfan Argun.  The

Istanbul-based Caucasus Foundation (www.kafkas.org.tr) is

instrumental in fundraising for Caucasus causes.  KADK could

be described as Abkhazia’s unofficial representation in

Turkey, though both Argun and Candemir maintain close ties to

Sukhumi, in particular with one Turkish-born Abkhaz

“parliamentarian,” Sener Gogua, who visits Turkey frequently

and told us he coordinates diaspora affairs for “President”

Bagapsh (reftel).  KADK and KAF-DER are both members of the

Federation for Caucasus Associations (kafkasfederasyonu.org),

an umbrella organization for Circassian NGOSs, also led by

Candemir.  But Argun and Candemir do not see eye-to-eye

completely.  KADK, Celikpala explained, welcomed Russia’s

recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, but is

concerned about Russian annexation of Abkhazia (South Ossetia

increasingly being seen as a lost cause).  Argun’s allies

continue to advocate for the rights of Caucasians in Russia

proper, including Chechens.  (KADK shares roots with the

Caucasian-Chechen Solidarity Committee, which played a

similar role in Turkey vis a vis Chechnya.)  Candemir pays

lip service to the same concerns about Russia, but has

reportedly developed close ties to the Russian Embassy in

Ankara and thus more reticent to criticize Moscow.  Yuksel

Insaat has extensive business interests throughout Russia and

the former Soviet Union; Candemir has, according to

Celikpala, used his KAF-DER and Federation leadership to

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cultivate ties on behalf of his company.  The upcoming 2014

Sochi Winter Olympic Games promise to be a boon for Yuksel

and other leading Turkish construction firms.  (NOTE:

Turkish MFA estimates that Turkish construction contracts in

Russia are worth $30 billion; $6 billion having been added

last year alone.  END NOTE.)

GEORGIANS

———

8.  (SBU) Turkish Georgians are primarily of Ajaran descent.

Being Muslim, they moved to or preferred to stay in Turkey

when the Soviet Union and Turkey formally delimited their

border in 1921.  Some Turks descending from Georgia claim an

Ahiska Turkish identity, allowing them to more easily

assimilate within Turkish society as Turks.  (NOTE:  The

Ahiska or Meskhetian Turks are ethnic Turks from present-day

Georgia who were deported by Stalin to Central Asia and are

now campaigning, with Ankara’s support, for the right to

return to their homeland.  END NOTE.)

9. (C) Georgian cultural identity is weaker (and Islamic

identity stronger) than for Circassians, and Georgians are

less active politically.  While not activists, Bilkent

University Professor Hasan Ali Karasar points out that

Georgians have retained important economic and political

influence in Turkey, primarily in the Black Sea region, but

also in Ankara (the Forest Ministry, for example, is

historically led by a Georgian, Karasar told us) and

Istanbul, where many have emigrated.  A number of key

political leaders, including PM Erdogan and nationalist

Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal are

reported to be of Georgian descent, though it is unclear how

much, if at all, they are influenced by their heritage;

neither would welcome any non-Turkish definitions of their

identity.  The Turkey-Georgia Inter-Parliamentary Friendship

Group has twenty members representing all three main parties

in Parliament.

10. (C) Turkish Georgians retain strong ties to Batumi,

viewing the eastern Black Sea region and Ajara as an

integrated whole.  Turkish Georgians have invested greatly in

Batumi and welcome GOT efforts to promote regional economic

integration with Georgia.  But they have complained about

Tbilisi’s alleged efforts to curtail Ajaran autonomy, of

which Turkey is a legal guarantor, they argue.  They also

complain about Georgian chauvinism.  Turkish Georgians

criticized, for example, the decision to insert a Georgian

cross in the Ajaran flag following Saakashvili’s successful

efforts to consolidate Ajara within Georgia (sending

then-Ajaran leader Abashidze fleeing via Trabzon).  Maps of

“Greater Georgia” that occasionally emerge from Georgia

showing the Eastern Turkish province of Artvin as part of

Georgia raise eyebrows here.  Turkish Georgians are also

watching closely for Tbilisi’s support for the repatriation

of the Ahiska Turks.

11. (C) While Saakashvili has not helped himself with Turkish

Georgians through his actions in Ajara, Tbilisi has

cultivated useful ties with some Turkish Georgian groups.

The oldest and principle Turkish-Georgian language newspaper

in Turkey, “Chveneburi,” (chveneburi.net) is decidedly

pro-Saakashvili in its coverage.  Acar Insaat, a large

Turkish construction firm, has close connections with the

Saakashvili administration, according to Celikpala.  A number

of other large holding groups in Turkey are run by ethnic

Georgians, including the Carmikli and Ozaltin groups, and

also maintain ties with Tbilisi.  In the 1990s, with GOG

support, Turkish and Georgian businessmen founded the

Turkish-Georgian Cultural and Solidarity Foundation in an

effort to balance the Abkhaz/Circassian lobby.  Additional

foundations and associations were created, but have never

competed effectively with the Circassians.  But the Russian

invasion of Georgia prompted, according to Karasar, the

first-ever street protests organized by Turkish Georgians, in

Ankara and Istanbul.  This may signal greater Georgian

political activism in the future, but it will be difficult

for Georgians to overcome their dislike for Saakashvili, even

as they express their solidarity with the Georgian people.

Turkish Georgians’ cultural awareness has been enhanced in

recent years through efforts by the Georgian Embassy in

Ankara and local governments in northeastern Turkey to

promote Turkey’s Georgian heritage, including hundreds of

churches, as a tourist attraction.

ANKARA 00001635  004 OF 005

HOW WILL TURKISH CAUCASIANS SHAPE GOT POLICY?

———————————————

12. (C) Turkey will not break ranks with its Western allies

to recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia.  Circassian voters

are an important nationalist vote base, but as nationalist

National Action Party (MHP) Vice Chairman Vural Oktay told

us, “Turkey comes first.”  While pragmatic on Kosovo (a

testament to the strength of ethnic lobbies in Turkey;

Kosovar Turks campaigned strongly for Kosovo’s independence),

adherence to the principle of territorial integrity

underscores Turkey’s own political unity, namely with regards

to the Kurdish question, ensuring Turkey acts carefully.  The

Turks will also not wish to take any action that destabilizes

Georgia.  Georgia is a buffer between Russia and Turkey; the

Turks have no interest in once again bordering Russia, with

whom they fought 13 wars over the centuries.

13. (C) At the same time, the GOT will be under considerable

pressure from the Circassian lobby.  While diffuse and

factionalized, the lobby includes a number of well-placed,

influential businesspeople and former high-level bureaucrats

who will urge the GOT to alter its policy of non-engagement

with Abkhazia.  These groups have argued that Turkey’s

“unilateral,” pro-Tbilisi policies have ignored the plight of

peoples living in the region, re-subjecting them to Russian

domination.  Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM)

Senior Researcher Hasan Kanbolat underscored the Turkish

Circassian view that Abkhazia desires a Western orientation

and that Turkish engagement with Abkhazia (if not

recognition) is essential to forestalling Russian annexation

of Abkhazia.  At the urging of Tbilisi, Ankara has avoided

direct engagement with Sukhumi, leaning on Circassian NGOs to

cancel two “unofficial” visits by Bagapsh (though a visit by

“FM” Shamba took place  in June 2008) and holding back its

proposal to link Sukhumi to Trabzon by ferry.  The GOT has

long complained to us privately about Georgia’s opposition to

even limited engagement with Abkhazia and may no longer be

persuaded by the Georgian argument that any unofficial

engagement would constitute de facto recognition.  As we have

learned through our contacts with Turkish Circassian groups,

some Turkish businessmen are already traveling to and

planning to invest in Abkhazia.

14. (SBU) Criticism of Turkish “unilateral” policy in the

Caucasus has resonated beyond the Circassian lobby.  As

evidenced by public support for Turkish-Armenian

rapprochement, Turks favor dialogue as a means to solve

problems.  Turkish analysts have argued that Turkey has

wasted opportunities to prevent this latest conflict by not

exercising its historic and cultural linkages with the

peoples of the Caucasus.  Karasar, for example, has argued

that, in addition to normalizing relations with Armenia,

Turkey should seek dialogue with all parties in the region.

It should channel humanitarian aid to the separatist enclaves

of Georgia while investing heavily in Georgia’s

reconstruction.  It should accept refugees from Georgia’s

war-torn regions, and establish direct economic relations

with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including establishing a

flight between Sukhumi and Istanbul.  He further advises that

Turkey expand existing scholarship programs for Caucasians

from across the region with an eye to shaping the region’s

democratic future.  Karasar has endorsed Turkey’s Caucasus

Stability and Cooperation Platform concept, but predicts the

platform will fail if it does not offer a seat at the table

to all peoples represented in conflict areas, including

Abkhazians, Ossetians, and even Nagorno-Karabakhians.

RUSSIA AND THE CHECHNYA EXPERIENCE

———————————-

15. (C) The extent to which Russia would support enhanced

Turkish engagement with Abkhazia and other separatist

enclaves in the Caucasus is unclear.  The GOT believes

Russians harbor lingering historical doubts about Turkey’s

intentions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and will be wary

to lose influence to pro-Western, NATO-member Turkey.  In the

meantime, Russia will likely continue playing the Circassian

card to foster division between Turkey and Georgia and seek

to exploit the sympathies most Turks have for the Abkhaz in

the conflict with Georgia.  Russia witnessed first hand

Circassian influence in Turkey during the 1990s when Turkey

tacitly sided with the Chechens in their separatist war

against Russia, making “unofficial” contacts with Chechen

ANKARA 00001635  005 OF 005

leaders, allowing the Chechens to establish unofficial

representation in Istanbul, permitting Chechen insurgents to

move freely within Turkey, and funneling humanitarian aid to

Chechnya over Russian complaints the aid was cover for

weapons shipments.  In 1991, four Chechens, including Shamil

Basayev, hijacked a Russian plane and flew it to Ankara to

highlight their cause.  The Turks refused the hijackers a

press conference, but allowed them to return to Chechnya

despite Russian demands for their arrest.  Overall Turkish

support for the Chechen cause waned eventually as the

insurgency became increasingly associated with terrorism;

Abkhazia is now the cause celebre for Turkish Circassians.

CIRCASSIANS AND CYPRUS

———————-

16. (C) Turkish Circassians point to Turkey’s recognition of

an independent “TRNC” as justification for Turkish

recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The Russians too

have invoked northern Cyprus as a precedent.  Russia argued

the West paved the way for widespread recognition of the

“TRNC” by recognizing Kosovo’s independence.  Later, Russia’s

Ambassador in Ankara reportedly proposed a convenient

quid-pro-quo to Turkey, suggesting Russian “TRNC” recognition

in exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia.  The Turks have not accepted this thinking, and do

not trust Russia on Cyprus.  Moscow is perceived in Ankara as

pro-Greek Cypriot, whereas Moscow has traditionally viewed

the “TRNC” as a base of support for Caucasian separatism.

(NOTE:  Then-Chechen “President” Dudayev held the “TRNC” up

as a model for Chechnya during his first “official” visit

abroad to Turkey and the “TRNC” in 1992, where he met with

then-“TRNC” “President” Denktash.  END NOTE.)  Turkey,

despite its recognition of the “TRNC,” supports the

reunification of Cyprus as a bicommunal federation.  Turkey

has urged the international community to end the isolation of

northern Cypriots but has never lobbied the international

community strongly on formal “TRNC” recognition.

Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08ANKARA1635.html

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