Contnue:
Russian Federation: Ethnic Discrimination in Southern Russia / 2
THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIA IN RUSSIA
Three interconnected factors have contributed to the rise of xenophobia in Russia: a misguided and failed Soviet nationalities policy; migration caused by ethnic strife and the collapse of the Soviet Union; and economic dislocation resulting from the introduction of a market economy. Some authors have dubbed this phenomenon “Chernofobiya,” or “Blackphobia,” indicating the fear of darker-skinned non-Slav minorities in the former Soviet Union.
These minorities are commonly thrown together in media propaganda and public consciousness into the hated category of “individual of Caucasian nationality.”[6] Ethnic Caucasians have replaced Jews, who now enjoy a more secure existence in Russia than in the past, as the main target for manipulation of public ethnic xenophobia. A 1994 survey revealed that between 30 and 34 percent of ethnic Russians are “distrustful” of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Chechens; the only ethnic group less trusted was the Roma (36.3 percent). As one Caucasian woman put it, “They say we are lazy, that we steal, that we are parasites on the backs of Moscow… For forty-five years I slaved for this country and now, because I am from the Caucasus, I’m treated like a human being of the lowest sort.”[7]
As war and ethnic conflicts began to rock parts of the former Soviet Union, the Soviet mass media and later the Russian media did little to foster ethnic tolerance. Rather than report on the true causes of ethnic conflict in the Caucasus, the media often presented it as mere “hooliganism” or the untrammeled destructive nature of the native people. One commentator argues that:
Mass ethnic stereotypes began to change in Russia at the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s….[How] the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia were reflected in the mass media [played a role]. For political reasons the real reasons behind the events, the argumentation of the sides, the means of struggle (for example, peaceful demonstrations and strikes), and any other information that could have shown the conflict as political, was hushed up. On the other hand, things like pogroms and later deportations which could not be hidden were shown in the massmedia as almost inexplicable [nemotivirovannyie] outbursts from hooligan elements. The principle of parity [practiced by the media] dictated that a pogrom from one side would be followed by a pogrom from the other so that both sides would appear equally wild…This combination of unpredictability and aggression gave birth in mass consciousness to the archetype of the “wild mountain man,” which later…[became] “LKN [litso kavkazskoi natsional’nosti],” “individual of Caucasian nationality.”[8]
Many equate all Caucasians with bandits, drug and arms dealers, or ethnic “terrorists.” At the end of 1995, the head of Moscow’s regional directorate for organized crime, Mikhail Suntsov, told reporters that “certain hard-core [ustoichovyi] characteristics of behavior, including criminal, exist for certain ethnic groups.”[9] His reference was to Caucasians. A leader of the Armenian community in Stavropol lamented in 1996 that, “We live as hostages. If one Armenian commits a crime, all the Armenians could pay for it.”[10]
Acts of violence, whether politically-motivated or not, have served as a catalyst for xenophobic outbreaks. In April 1997, when bombs exploded in train stations in Armavir (in Krasnodar province) and in Pyatigorsk (in Stavropol province), killing five and injuring scores, Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov warned of pogroms against ethnic Caucasians in the region.[11] The bombs were allegedly set by Chechens. Kulikov reported that his office received hundreds of letters from southern Russia demanding the expulsion of all Chechens from the region.
The failure of high-ranking state officials to condemn xenophobia has exacerbated the problem. An Armenian activist in Krasnodar complained:
Not once did an official representative, going from Polozkov to Kondratenko… and up to today’s local authorities, openly speak out in the press on this question, they did not identify the attitude of the authorities toward the multi-ethnic make-up of the region, not once was anything said about the importance of, about the contribution of these nationalities to the economy, cultural life, health-care system.” [If they had done this] the populace would have seen, but there was no response. During these intra-ethnic outbreaks the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] does its job, tries to calm things down, and gets thanks for it, but the leadership of the region never once condemned such actions, whether it be the head of the province, the governor, the mayor, or even their representatives, never once called on people to respect peace and good neighborliness, never once said that this is our home, which we all are building and where we all live.[12]
The Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy
Soviet nationalities policy contributed to ethnic strife and xenophobia through the post-Soviet era. Communist ideology stifled the question of ethnicity and nationalism. Under the slogan, “Nationalist in Form, Socialist in Content,” the ethnic minorities of the former Soviet Union were allowed a limited level of linguistic and cultural autonomy but no real political power. The code words “Internationalism” and the “Friendship of Peoples” were used to indicate “ethnic harmony” under Russian and communist party guidance.[13] Eventually, it was hoped, a “Soviet People” would emerge under the leadership of the communist party as national differences subsided and the peoples of the former USSR merged (sblizheniye narodov). Internal passports, mandatory since 1932 and crucial to individuals for navigating the bureaucratic maze of the Soviet state, prominently marked one’s ethnicity. A manipulative form of affirmative action promoted ethnic minorities, but at the same time reserved key spots and positions for Slavs, especially Russians. Eventually, “Russian ethnicity” was promoted to primas inter pares as ethnicity and nationalism among non-Russians proved more tenacious then earlier thought. Russification efforts were intensified.
Nationality (ethnicity) was, ironically, the framework of a system that professed scientific socialism. Ethnicity was the fifth point, the pyatyi punkt, in application for mandatory internal passports introduced in 1932, another point was “class origin.”[14] A Soviet press account from the early 1980s illustrates the importance of the internal passport:
The passport is needed when registering for a residency permit and when applying for permission to change one’s residence, when applying for admission to an educational institution or for a job, and when registering a marriage. Unless a passport is presented, post offices will not give people money orders, letters or telegrams by general delivery.[15]
Russian citizens still use these internal passports as their main identity document. In July 1997, the Russian government adopted a resolution on new Russian internal passports that gave regional government the authority to retain or relinquish the fifth point.[16]
Ethnicity also served as the basis for territorial administrative units, which were nominally administered by local leaders. Often borders were drawn under the principle of divide and conquer. Sub-units, so-called autonomous republics or oblasts, were often arbitrarily carved out of republics, the largest administrative unit. To that end, central planners strove to “create” nationalities where before only loose distinctions applied. In the North Caucasus, for example, the Cherkess people were subdivided into smaller units, each with its own territory. In all of these territories, however, real political decisions were left to the center in Moscow. Often, the first party secretary of a region was a representative of the titular nationality, while the second party secretary Moscow’s man would be a Russian or other Slav.
By the early 1970s, it was clear that a “Soviet People” had not been created. While there was pride in a “Sovietness,” national feeling was as strong as ever, even if submerged under official ideology and KGB oppression.[17] Rather than confront the issue of growing nationalism and its role in the Soviet state, the party leadership openly stated what had been the case all along: the dominance of ethnic Slavs, especially Russians. In 1971, at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev told the delegates that, “All the nations and nationalities of our country, above all the Great Russian people, played a role in the formation, strengthening, and development of this mighty union of equal peoples…The revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and profound internationalism of the Great Russian people have rightfully won them the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist homeland.”[18] In 1977, a new constitution increased central authority even more.[19] A revised version of the Soviet national anthem replaced paeans to Stalin with ones to “Great Russia.”[20]
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