Georgia’s Lost Potential to Support North Caucasus Decolonization
4 May, 2024
Contributor
Thornike Gordadze
In the tumultuous 1990s, amid the intense violence of the Chechen war, a remarkable shift occurred among all my Chechen friends and acquaintances—they abruptly ceased drinking alcohol. Instead, as a gesture of camaraderie, they would raise a glass of water in toast, proclaiming: “Za vas, za nas, za svobodnyi Kavkaz!” (For you, for us, for the free Caucasus). While the toast itself was ancient, originating from Soviet times, the concluding phrase had been modified from “Severnyi (North) Kavkaz” to “Svobodnyi (Free) Kavkaz.” Through conversations with scholarly colleagues from the North Caucasus, I consistently encountered a deep-seated appreciation for Georgia, both politically and culturally. As one of my Dagestani friends, a professor expressed it, Georgia was viewed as “the only truly Caucasian nation in the South Caucasus.”
Throughout history, Georgia has grappled with the dilemma of whether to engage in the affairs of the North Caucasus or to remain aloof, sometimes even aligning tacitly, if not actively, with the colonizer’s agenda. Georgia’s pursuit of independence and its security and foreign policy orientations towards the West has consistently recognized the importance of a free North Caucasus under Russian influence. Consequently, all patriotic political factions in Georgia, whether predominantly liberal or nationalistic, have, to some degree, endorsed the notion of North Caucasian emancipation. Consequently, assuming that Georgia’s European aspirations and its active engagement with its North Caucasian neighbors are mutually exclusive is misleading. Rather, these two policies complement each other, collectively bolstering Georgia’s independence. However, the current Georgian government diverges from this historical stance, prioritizing accommodation with Russia over this traditional policy. Read more
