Why is Circassian Political Agenda in Double Danger?
There is a striking resemblance between the articles and position papers about Circassia, Circassian nationalism and Circassian political goals. The majority of the authors and of the experts usually spend half of the time elaborating about historical facts and usually only a few scarce lines are about new subjects and new dynamics related with the Circassians’ political agenda.
I will try to do it differently. Do not take me wrongly, I surely believe that knowing Circassian past history is quintessential. But I also believe that it is irrelevant to repeat the same facts over and over, instead of adding something new. In the years immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Circassians were not among the most pro-active ethnic groups towards autonomy or independence.
As Julietta Meskhidze reports, the Balkars began their autonomist movement at the 17th of November 1991 with the organization of the first Congress of the Balkar People. At the event Balkars “declared the national sovereignty of the Balkar people and approved the establishment of the Republic of Balkaria” (Meskhidze, 2008: 69). Astonishingly we notice that “the challenge of Balkar separatism finally overrode the barriers to a truly mass mobilization” (Derlugian, 2003: 210) from the (until then) low profiled Kabardians (Kabardians represent one of the most populous Circassian groups).
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TIAGO FERREIRA LOPES – EXPERT OF STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
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There is a striking resemblance between the articles and position papers about Circassia, Circassian nationalism and Circassian political goals. The majority of the authors and of the experts usually spend half of the time elaborating about historical facts and usually only a few scarce lines are about new subjects and new dynamics related with the Circassians’ political agenda.
I will try to do it differently. Do not take me wrongly, I surely believe that knowing Circassian past history is quintessential. But I also believe that it is irrelevant to repeat the same facts over and over, instead of adding something new. In the years immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Circassians were not among the most pro-active ethnic groups towards autonomy or independence.
As Julietta Meskhidze reports, the Balkars began their autonomist movement at the 17th of November 1991 with the organization of the first Congress of the Balkar People. At the event Balkars “declared the national sovereignty of the Balkar people and approved the establishment of the Republic of Balkaria” (Meskhidze, 2008: 69). Astonishingly we notice that “the challenge of Balkar separatism finally overrode the barriers to a truly mass mobilization” (Derlugian, 2003: 210) from the (until then) low profiled Kabardians (Kabardians represent one of the most populous Circassian groups).
Kabardians were not only lately awakened but they also misdirected their political fights: instead of asking for autonomy and ethnic sovereignty from Moscow, Kabardians were more concerned in counter-target the Balkar autonomic project. And the Cherkessk (another Circassian ethnic group), living in Karachaevo-Cherkessia republic, were even less active. Just to make it clear, we should recognize that “Cherkessk and Kabardians are very closely related ethnically, and all call themselves Adyghe, but since the thirteenth century they have been known in Europe and the East as Circassians” (Coene, 2010: 60).
It may seem an act of boldness, the fact that the First International Circassian Congress happened on Nalchik (capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria republic) in 1991. Unfortunately, the conclusions of the Congress were at best disappointing. It is a fact that the Congress final resolution “went directly to the heart of the most serious Circassian global national problem, the problem of assimilation” (Natho, 2009: 559) but the Congress was unable to get a broader scope. Since there was no clear word about the next step to be taken, the movement lost its vitality and visibility.
Summing up, while the Chechens were fighting the Russians and the Laks, the Kumyks, the Dargins and the Lezgins were on the streets demanding for greater autonomy, Circassians were spending their energy fighting other Caucasus ethnic groups demands and talking internally, during the last decade of the XX century, and the first decade of the post-soviet period.
With this portrayed background there is little surprise when we recognize that the Circassian republics “were moving into the 2000s burdened by local authoritarianism, the politicization of Islamic practice, and tensions between Circassians and Turkic populations” (King, 2008: 241) as well as an unstable environment between the Caucasus native ethnicities and ethnic Russians. In the beginning of the new millennium there was the feeling that a small flame of ethnic confrontation could have ignited the monstrous fire of ethnic and civil wars.
Surprisingly the Circassian pan-national movement made a u-turn in the XXI century. Thanks to internet and virtual social networks “Circassians were connecting with each other, and young Circassians realized what happened to their nation” (Bullough, 2010: 140) and so those younger generations started a new wave of contestation at theirs hosting countries. The re-awakening of the Circassian identity across the diaspora settlements and the new claims to the recognition of the Circassian genocide were accompanied with the unexpected announcement, in Vancouver in July 2007, of the realization of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in the Caucasian city of Sochi.
“By an irony of history, the 2014 Olympic Games will mark the 150th anniversary of the Circassian defeat in 1864, when, after over a century of fighting, Tsar Alexander II declared victory for Russia” (Zhemukhov, 2009: 2) and ordered a deportation of the remaining Circassians from the port of Sochi to the Ottoman Empire. Even more dramatic, “a victory parade was held on the Black Sea coast just north of Abkhazia, [on a place] called Krasnaya Polyana (“Red Glade”)” (Waal, 2010: 149) to commemorate the end of the Russian-Circassian War, and that exact place coincides with one of the main stages of the Winter Olympic Games 2014.
The new shed of light that the games have brought towards the Circassians’ demands is also the core of the double threat, that menaces pan-Circassianism or pan-Circassianess to use Brubaker’s proposal, when he says that “we should focus on nationhood and nationness, on “nation” as practical category” (Brubaker, 2009: 7) and not as a mere academic reification of complex feelings and socio-cultural common features.
It is inaccurate not to mention that Moscow moderate politicians are trying to avoid any type of violence or open confrontation. Instead of that the Kremlin, in order to soften the impact of the demands made by the Circassians scattered across the globe, is advocating that “only in the Russian Federation (…) can the Circassians enjoy the privilege of developing their culture and even a certain degree of statehood” (Dzutsev a.), Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2011). The Kremlin’s stance may seize some results since Circassians living inside the Russian Federation are more willing to cooperate with the Russian authorities, than their co-nationals of the diaspora.
Recently “Zamir Shukhov, the leader of the Circassian organization Khase in Nalchik, (…) emphasized in his report for the Russian Public Chamber the benefits Russia would obtain from allowing the Circassians to return to their homeland in the North Caucasus” (Dzutsev b.), Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2011), fulfilling a promise of the previous Russian Administrations to put in place a plan of resettlement, to those Circassians who want to return to the homeland. However, despite the initial invitation to cooperation “the head of the working group on the Caucasus, Maxim Shevchenko, expressly prohibited discussing any problems that divided peoples face in Russia” (Dzutsev b.), Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2011) and so Circassian demands are being silenced as much as possible.
Presently, the strategy from Moscow seems to be quite clear. The key priority is to lower the visibility of the Circassian demands on the media; and simultaneously Circassian representatives, living inside the Russian Federation, are being called to unproductive talks and stalling negotiations. The absence of an education oriented to preserve and develop a Circassian identity and its awareness, inside the Russian Federation, is another tool used by the Kremlin since the beginning of the Putin era. According to “Okhtov [activist from Karachaevo-Cherkessia], many Circassians in the North Caucasus have been unable to receive an education in the Circassian language and are rapidly losing their identity” (Dzutsev b.), Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2011).
I have argued in April this year, in a lecture that I have given at the Circassian Cultural Institute in the United States of America, that the need to strengthen and the Circassian identity and to codify the identitarian pattern is crucial to ensure the persecution of the political goals aimed by Circassians of the diaspora. This fundamental need to rediscover the singularity of the human being and to ensure the security of all human beings identitarian profiles is an essential feature to those who support and advocate the U.N.’s human security paradigm.
“It is obvious that Moscow considers a smooth realization of the Winter Olympic Games a major opportunity to improve the country’s image both at home and abroad” (Souleimanov, 2011: 66) and so all the means to diminish, if not silence, the impact of the Circassian demands are being exploited by the Kremlin; something similar to what China has made with the Tibetan protesters during the Beijing Olympic Games.
Although perilous to the fulfillment of the Circassian’s political agenda, the opposition coming from Moscow is, more or less, something expected. What is unexpected, and constitutes the second threat to the effectiveness of the Circassian political agenda, are the divisions among Circassians. As an example of these divisions, while a huge number of Circassian organization are against the realization of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi on “September 2 (…) a group of Circassian organizations in Kabardino-Balkaria had announced a memorandum in support of the Olympics in Sochi (…) The coordination council of Circassian organizations, Adyge Khase, and the Union of Abkhaz Volunteers [also] signed the statement” (Observatório de Segurança Humana, 2011).
We should notice that the majority of the Circassian organizations that have signed the memorandum are based in the Russian-controlled North Caucasus and some of them are openly pro-Moscow organizations. This fuzziness in the communication of the “truthful” Circassian demands was supposed to be surpassed by the action of the International Circassian Association. But what should happen sometimes is not the outcome.
The last meeting of the International Circassian Association in the beginning of October 2011 revealed to be a disappointment and reinforced the opinion of numerous Circassian organizations across the diaspora: the International Circassian Association has lost its legitimacy to speak for the Circassians worldwide and needs to be replaced by another organization or institution. The challenge here is to define who can drawn the new hub for the promotion of the Circassian political agenda; and most importantly Circassians must reach an agreement on how should that organization be drawn.
We can pre-conclude that not only “Circassian activists who oppose the 2014 Olympics in Sochi and advance the goals of a Circassian revival appear to be increasingly under pressure from the Russian state” (Dzutsev c.), Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2011) but also that the fractions among Circassian organizations are seriously menacing the persecution of the Circassian political agenda. If Circassians are unable to make their message clear and to make it a unified one, they will lose the Sochi Winter Olympics moment and the opportunity to sow some seeds at an international level.
Curiously, Portugal may have an important word in the chess game of Circassian affairs. If we remember that the Portuguese politician João Soares was recently appointed OSCE Representative to the Caucasus (an organization that can bring the discussion of the establishment of a Circassian state to the Western agenda); and that Jorge Sampaio, former President of the Portuguese Republic, is the U.N. High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations (one of the Circassian demands is the need to protect and recognize their civilizational value, originality and uniqueness).
Equally important, the former prime-minister of Portugal, António Guterres, is the U.N. High Commissioner for the Refugees (it is not an overstatement that, in some measure, Circassian are understood as political refugees; even if they have born in their hosting countries); and Durão Barroso, also a former Portuguese prime-minister, is the President of the European Commission (in October 2006 a group of Circassians has sent a document to the European Union asking for the recognition of the Circassian Genocide; there was never an official answer to the appeal) we can understand why Portugal may be a player to have in account. Adding to this, we should also recall that Portugal was elected for a two years mandate as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
It is easily agreeable that presently “there are no armed conflicts and separatist movements lost popular support” (Richmond, 2008: 151) at the Northwest Caucasus (where are located the Circassian republics). It is, however, a fact that ethno-religious violence in Kabardino-Balkaria is getting worse since 2009 and it is now spilling its bloody tentacles to Karachaevo-Cherkessia so now one can predict what will happen in the next three years.
What is predictable is that Russian authorities would have a greater profit in a medium-long term if they (finally!) show a real desire to solve the Circassian demands, or at least to satisfy some of those demands. Circassians, on their side, must re-organize internally in order to avoid the dissemination of a messy, clouded and unproductive message that no one will understand. If Circassians are fragile because they need to re-design a central institution/organization, they are also stronger if they can play intelligently the “Portuguese card”.
Yes, there is a real double danger (the Russian desire to silence Circassian activism and the lack of unity and homogeneity among Circassian representatives) to the accomplishment of the Circassian political agenda. But this does not have to mean the end of the game. The next move of the Circassian activists will decide if they continue playing or if the Kremlin has finally made check-mate to Circassia!
Tiago Ferreira LOPES – Analyst of Strategic Outlook
Researcher at the Orient Institute (ISCSP – UTL, Portugal)
Executive Officer of the Observatory for Human Security (ISCSP – UTL, Portugal)
Works cited
Brubaker, Rogers, 2009. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Bullough, Oliver, 2010. Let Our Fame be Great: Journeys among the defiant people of the Caucasus. London: Penguin Books
Coene, Frederik, 2010. The Caucasus: An Introduction. London: Routledge
Derlugian, Georgi, 2003. Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. Chicago: Chicago University Press
Dzutsev c.), Valery, 2011. Moscow hardens its confrontational stance toward Circassian Activists. Eurasia Daily Monitor [on-line], Vol. 8, Issue 190. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38536&cHash=1bc09661ca00369c5c14828d9741a5b6
Dzutsev b.), Valery, 2011. Radical departure from Moscow’s current Circassian strategy remain low. Eurasia Daily Monitor [on-line], Vol. 8, Issue 123. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38100&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512
Dzutsev a.), Valery, 2011. Circassians’ growing awareness of their tragic past raises concerns in Moscow. Eurasia Daily Monitor [on-line], Vol. 8, Issue 113. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38045&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512
King, Charles, 2008. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Lopes, Tiago Ferreira, 2011. Troubles at Prometeus’ Lair: Sochi Olympic Games 2014 in a Human Security Perspective. Communication presented at the Circassian Lectures, Circassian Cultural Institute, New Jersey, United States of America, 10th of April 2011
Meskhidze, Julietta, 2008. The events of November 1996 in Kabardino-Balkaria and their prehistory. In: Gammer, Moshe (ed.), Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus. London: Routledge
Natho, Kadir, 2009. Circassian History. New York: Xlibris Corporation
Observatório de Segurança Humana, 2011. Circassian organizations support the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Published on-line at the 8th of September. Available at: http://www.segurancahumana.eu/News/1233-Circassian-organizations-support-the-2014-Sochi-Olympics
Richmond, Walter, 2008. The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future. London: Routledge
Souleimanov, Emil, 2011. The North Caucasus Islamist insurgency and the (in)security of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi (2014). Portuguese Journal of International Affairs, N. º 5, pp. 66 – 71
Waal, Thomas de, 2010. The Caucasus: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Zhemukhov, Sufian, 2009. The Circassian Dimension of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Ponars Policy Memo, N. º 65, pp. 1 – 5
