The Circassian Endgame: Building Alliances to Ensure a Better Future for All
Paul Goble
For delivery to Conference on
“The Circassian Genocide in the Context of History and Contemporary Politics”
Vilnius, Lithuania
December 17, 2025
Like the Baltic countries in the final decades of Soviet times, Circassians today are now positioned to retake control of their history, recover their state independence, and reshape a post-Russian reality not only for themselves but for other victims of Muscovite imperialism. That makes this Circassian meeting today at the Lithuanian parliament in Vilnius especially significant. But Circassians will only achieve the same success the Baltic nations have if they focus on these parallels and the lessons the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have provided. Because I was someone who was actively involved in the Baltic cause a generation ago and who is deeply sympathetic to the Circassian cause now, I would like to suggest a few of the lessons the Circassians should take from the Baltic cause as they enter the final stretch in their drive to retake the past and achieve the restoration of an independent homeland, lessons that should give Circassians a measure of optimism many of them do not now have.
Before the Baltic countries recovered their independence in 1991, many people thought that outcome would be impossible given the size of the Muscovite state, on the one hand, and the Baltic nations on the other. But the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians won out because they had and exploited three key advantages:
■ First, they never forgot their past and the way in which the Russian occupiers had victimized them. That memory was central to the formation of their national movements and has remained central even after their independence was fully restored.
■ Second, they recognized and made use of the large Baltic emigrations in the West to generate and then maintain support there for their cause, something Moscow usually found it impossible to counter.
■ And third, for both of these reasons, the Baltic movements always conceived their task as far broader than themselves and reached out to support and form alliances with peoples similarly situated. They helped other nations within the USSR to form popular fronts, independent trade unions, and ultimately the other attributes of independent countries. They thus had allies among these peoples when Moscow tried to break their movements, allies that included not just other non-Russians but many Russian democrats as well.
Circassians too must first recognize and then build upon these parallels if they are to have the success Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have had. There are compelling reasons to think that they will be able to and thus will have success equal to or perhaps even greater than that of the Balts.
Above all, the Circassians are united by the memory of the genocide that the Russian Empire inflicted upon them and that both the Soviet state and the Russian Federation have continued. No Circassian, no matter how much pressure Moscow applies or how great the temptation to collaborate with the Russian powers may be, can ever forget that the Circassians resisted with arms in their hands the advance of the Russian empire for more than a century and have continued to resist since that time because Moscow has continued to pursue a policy of genocide by continuing attempts at divide and rule administration and the suppression of the language and culture of the Circassian people. Moreover, again like the Balts, they have learned that calling attention to these horrors has helped them to build bridges to other nations who have been victims in similar ways.
Even more important, however, has been the Circassian recognition and use of its enormous diaspora. There are now at least ten times as many Circassians in the diaspora than there are in the homeland, and they are extremely influential in many countries like Turkey and Jordan where they occupy senior positions in the security services and military. Indeed, it is worth noting that there are at least seven times as many Circassians living abroad are Lithuanians in the United States. The specific actions members of the three Baltic diasporas took are an obvious model for Circassians, and what is no less important they provide a remarkable basis for confidence about the future. Moscow understands this threat and has sought to penetrate and disorder Circassian organizations abroad so as to keep them weak and isolated from the governments of the countries where Circassians leave. But it has been less than fully successful, and so the future of the Circassian homeland is certain to depend on the diaspora just as was the case with the three Baltic nations. Many Circassians understand this, but even they need to look at what the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians did in the past and continue to do now in order to gain the full value of their model.
But it is the third lesson that the Baltic cause provides that may ultimately prove the most important. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, as committed as they were to the achievement of their own distinct national goals never forgot that they could do so only if they reached out to others in the empire similarly situated, formed alliances with them, and even worked to cooperate with regionalist movements and even, despite all the obstacles, ethnic Russian regionalists democrats. Baltic activists not only helped power the growth of such movements but had the effect of creating networks prepared to help the Baltic nations in their struggle. One should never forget the role Baltic activists played in developing the national movements in
Ukraine and Moldova, for example, or the fact that the largest demonstration in support of the Baltic peoples against Russian attack was in Moscow following Gorbachev’s deadly use of Soviet troops at the Vilnius television tower on January 13, 1991. Had those alliances not been developed in advance, the Kremlin might very well have decided that it could act more brutally against the Baltic movements than it did. Now, the countries Circassians must develop closer ties with are not the same as those the Balts did. Instead of the US and Europe, they include Turkey, Ukraine and Lithuania to name but the most obvious. They have been doing so, and the results are already proving invaluable.
As ever more Circassians recognize, they also have potentially important allies among other nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation, despite all the efforts Moscow has made to block them; and these include even ethnic Russians both in the hard-pressed predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays but also members of the Russian democratic movement dominated by ethnic Russians in and from Moscow. Both because of their own national culture and skills honed in dealing with the binational republics that the Soviet state created and the Russian one continues, Circassians have been compelled to hone their skills at cooperating with other peoples of the North Caucasus. That has undercut Moscow’s efforts to sow discord and paves the way for mutual support in the looming crisis of Russian statehood and for good relations among these nations following the disintegration of the Russian Federation. And a Circassian willingness to work with ethnic Russians in the regions who also are victims of Moscow’s “yoke” and even among members of the Russian democratic movement, many of whose participants understand that only by supporting the non-Russians can they end their own victimization, will only further advance the cause. For many Circassians, just as for many Balts, working with people from nations they view as their enemies won’t be entirely welcome or easy; but again, as the Baltic movement showed, it can prove critical not only at the moment of the rupture of the Muscovite state but also long afterwards.
Learning and applying all these lessons won’t be easy for the Circassians, but they already have made major steps in that direction. Securing Ukraine’s recognition of the Russian genocide directed against the Circassians was a major step forward. Having meetings like this one in Lithuania is another. And because such steps echo the successes the Balts had earlier, Circassians should have renewed confidence that they are going to win through, knowledgeable that the last steps always look the most difficult but are most likely to be achieved if they are prepared for in advance, something that was true for Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians 35 years ago and will be true for Circassians at the moment of their rapidly approaching triumph.
