When The Blind Leads The Blind

27-Narch-2006

According to “MosNews” dated 25.03.2006, a Pentagon report says “Russia Spies Gave Saddam Intelligence Through 2003”.

That what reminded of “Where ignorance is a bliss, it’s folly to be wise”. May a curious would question and investigate those statements.

The obvious response would be easy and straight forward. Those KGB spies failed to protect the “Warso Pact”, the alliance of Communist Eastern European regimes, the Communist Soviet Union, and the Kremlin backed regimes in the former Soviet Republics. The eventualities are still prevailing with the FSB as a dominating successor of KGB!

How could the FSB system that succeeded the KGB protect Saddam Hussein and his regime, while the same facilities that both evil systems possessed and used are of same origin, source, and commencement had failed to do so with similar situations?
If the blind leads the blind, so both would fall in the same ditch, and that is the story of intelligence information that would be depended on when it comes from untrustworthy source and/or sources.

It is possible for those systems to suppress citizens and individuals which they are unbeatable in those evil acts that those spies and agents carried out against the empty-handed peoples and citizens. They invented the art of brutal torture and the subdue against all self- conscious elements of the society.

They carried out those wicked and sinful acts to terrorize, scare and perform the domestic violence to be the powers that dictate, prescribe, impose, and determine the way the government branches should actuate.

They functioned with enormous efforts to behave in a disgraceful manner against the Human Rights NGO’s and all the ordinary citizens in former Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, Chechnya, and in all regions of what is presently known as Federal Republic Of Russia.

The KGB Intelligence System of the former Soviet Union neither detected nor forecasted the Israeli plans of the “6-Day War” of June 1967, which made Israel able to occupy the land of three Arab Countries, even though the Soviets were connected with two of those countries through “Friendship & Cooperation” strategic treaties and those two countries were depending on the Soviet recommendations and supplies as main source.

The records indicate that in October, 6, 1973, during the “Ramadan War” (October War), when Late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt wanted to fight a serious war he kicked out thousands of Russian (Soviet) advisors, and managed to cross the Suez Canal and to reach the “Sinai Narrows”. Kicking out the advisors was considered the reason of their victory.

While Syria, Egypt’s ally on the other side of the war zone,which got the Russian (Soviet) advisors at the time, could not hold on the land that the Syrian forces occupied from the Israeli forces, and they even lost more land to Israel, when the Israelis stopped at 56 Kilometers away from the capital city of Damascus.

The description that they used to describe the advisors as Russians, was because even during the Soviet era, the vast majority of those who ruled the Soviet Union were Russians, and where ever they sent advisors of any kind, those advisors were controlled and supervised by those agents and spies, and they were also called Russians by those foreign countries that they used to go and reside in.

They failed and weakened Saddam Hussein and his regime in his wars against Iran, Kuwait and last but not least his war against the United States and the Coalition Forces.

* In the 1st Gulf War against Iran, they played double face and double agent roles, to get the maximum benefits from both sides.

* In the 2nd Gulf War they maneuvered in a different, but more complicated behavior when they gave away the weapons’ and missiles’ codes to the “30 Countries Alliance”, they got paid the amount of four billion dollars by the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia to keep out of the game, and eventually by the end of the war, Mr. Primakov, who got a well known back ground in the Soviet intelligence, media, and politics, had traveled to Baghdad as a broker to mediate for certain cease fire conditions, terms, and measurements.

* The “Iraq Liberation War” as was called by the Coalition, which was  Saddam’s last mission to do as a President of Iraq, the Russian spies and intelligence agents through the Russian government and Russian ambassador in Iraq, gave Saddam Hussein the intelligence information which was proven to be false, wrong, mis-leading and mis-calculated, that took Saddam Hussein towards the ditch that he was found hiding in.

The great philosopher Lucretius said:

“One man’s meat is another man’s poison”

Eagle

From: MSN Nicknamezbashgov  (Original Message)    Sent: 3/31/2006 12:23 AM
http://justicefornorthcaucasus.com/genocide/pdf/Circassian_Names.pdf

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Beefs Up Internal Forces to Defend Against Domestic Disorder

From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 4/7/2006 2:32 AM

Mossad Agents Eliminated in the Northern Caucasus

The counterintelligence service of the CRI spotted two agents of the Mossad in 2005. Both were Chechens. They were eliminated after being revealed. Information about this fact is included in the official answer that AIA received from the Chechen rebel leadership, after making a request for the secret services’ activity in the region. The answer was received through the Kavkaz-Center Internet agency, which is considered to be the main trumpet of the anti-Russian forces in the region. In the document that we received, Israeli intelligence is mentioned as being among the main foreign secret services acting in the Northern Caucasus…

Israeli Trace in Chechnya

The first time the official representative of then independent Chechnya was informed about the Mossad’s activity in the republic was in June 1997. Abusupian Movsaev, who headed the National Security Service (SNB), in an interview to the Russian Profi newspaper, made this announcement. Later, in 1999 – 2001, the Chechen mass media published several reports on the arrest of Israeli agents in the territory of the republic. In December 2001 the head of the Security Council of the Russian Parliament, Viktor Iliuhin, implicitly confirmed this claim. Without revealing the sources of his information, he said that the Mossad is engaged in human intelligence in Chechnya.

Although Tel-Aviv and Moscow never confirmed this information, it is known that since the second half of the 1990s, the Mossad has been showing a growing interest in the situation in the Caucasus. This interest was caused by a “pilgrimage” to Chechnya of the Islamic Mujaheeds from all over the world, including the Arab countries (according to Russian sources, there were Palestinians among them, mainly from Jordan and Lebanon). This fact actually promoted the activating of contacts between Israeli and Russian secret services. The only proof of the Mossad’s operative interest towards the Chechen topic is connected to Efraim Halevi’s visit to Moscow, in the autumn of 2002. He came to Russia with a delegation of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Halevi was then head of the Mossad and of the National Security Council. In one of the articles in the Israeli Ha-Aretz newspaper it was mentioned that during Halevi’s meetings with his Russian counterparts, including Vladimir Rushailo (who was then the head of the Security Council), the parties discussed a mechanism for the exchange of data about the Arab Mujaheeds acting in the northern areas of Georgia adjacent to Chechnya’s border. However, then, as well as now, the Mossad is not the only secret service that takes an active interest in the situation in this region.

Special Services’ Crossroad

From a report based on materials of the Chechen separatists’ counterespionage it follows that in 2005 not only Russian and Israeli secret services conducted their activity in the Northern Caucasus, but also many other states: “first of all the intelligence structures of Britain, the USA and Germany. The secret services of France, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were involved to a smaller degree”. Compilers of the report note that in the Northern Caucasus also “operate agents of the secret services of Uzbekistan”. And the most interesting part is that: “for the last two – three years there is certain activity shown by the Chinese secret services, which are mainly acting in Daghestan and are engaged exclusively in gathering analytical information without any action”.

In the abovementioned interview, Abusupian Movsaev noted: “the Chechen Republic has turned into a busy crossroad where interests of various secret services are interlocking, both western, and eastern”. In April 2000, several months after the beginning of the second Chechen war, Movsaev accused western intelligence services, in particular those of the USA and Britain, of rendering assistance to Russia in its struggle against the forces of local resistance. Strangely enough, official representatives of the Kremlin then asserted almost the same allegation, only on the contrary blamed western services in assisting Chechens.

Even during the first Chechen campaign (December 1994 – August 1996), Moscow tried to prove that foreign special services were the main origin of destabilization in the Northern Caucasus. As their major argument they used data about the support of Chechen Republic independence adherents on behalf of their fellow tribesmen abroad (primarily in Turkey and the Arab countries), and also by several western humanitarian organizations. However, the Russian leaders had no convincing proof of the theory of a “foreign plot”. Aspiring to acquire confirmation as quickly as possible, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) lost one of its most valuable agents inside the CIA. In November 1996 the FBI arrested an officer of American intelligence, Harold James Nicholson. Before that he worked for many years in the CIA quarters in the Far East and in Eastern Europe, sometimes even heading the spying networks. In 1991 Nicholson was recruited by Russian intelligence, and in several months prior to the end of the first war in the Chechen Republic, he actively “researched” CIA activities in the territory of this republic.

FSB Accuses Turkey and Iran

Against the background of military actions in Daghestan in the summer of 1999 and the second Chechen campaign which followed after that, frequent reports on the participation of foreign intelligence in the activity of Caucasian supporters of radical Islam started to appear again in the Russian mass media. A part of such publications was ostensibly based on SVR and Federal Security Service’s (FSB) data. For example, one of such publications, referring to the confidential report of Russian intelligence noted: “Special services of Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia give the greatest attention to the republics of the Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan (regions of Russia with the highest percentage of Muslim population). Through the last years several cases of infiltration into the territory of the CIS by agents of special services and by emissaries of the Islamic centers under cover of repatriate- representatives of Chechen, Circassian, Kabardin and Balkari Diaspora were noted”. However, no concrete proof of that was presented. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Moscow has not published any indisputable fact testifying to connections between foreign intelligence services and local opponents of Russian authority. Moreover, as it follows from the communiquйs of the FSB, throughout all this time no official staff member of any foreign secret service was caught in the Northern Caucasus.

In February 2000 FSB officers arrested a citizen of Turkey, Ali Yaman, in the Chechen Republic. Several Russian mass media rushed to declare the capture “of a staff employee of a foreign special service”. On this basis, the former head of Soviet Foreign Intelligence, Leonid Shebarshin, said with confidence that: “There are people connected to the American, Turkish, and British secret services in the ranks of the Chechen militant troops”. However, in the FSB communiquй on the ending of litigation against Yaman in October 2000, there is no mention of his connections with any foreign intelligence service. He was sentenced to three years of imprisonment, as “with a weapon in hand he directly participated in military operations against federal forces in the Chechen Republic”. By the way, a similar case took place in the first Chechen campaign. In January 1995 a citizen of Turkey, Iskhak Kasap, was detained in Daghestan. Representatives of the FSB declared that he carried out tasks for Turkish intelligence MIT. However, no real confirmation of that was found and soon Kasap was deported home.

The absence of officially submitted proof has not prevented the head of the FSB press-service, Alexander Zdanovich, to declare in April 2001 the activating of foreign intelligence in the Northern Caucasus. As the main example of it he mentioned again the Turkish secret services. And the next year saw a peak in terms of the number of statements by Russian officials about connections between the intelligence bodies of foreign countries with the Caucasian opponents of the Kremlin.

Moreover, in this connection the usual list of countries (the USA, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan) was unexpectedly joined by Iran.

In May 2002, the deputy chairman of the pro-Russian government of the Chechen Republic, Beslan Gantamirov, accused the Iranian secret services of “financing terrorist activity in the territory of the republic”. A month later deputy head of the local FSB department in the Volgograd area, Vladimir Svetlichni, declared that Iranian intelligence “assists separatists in Southern Russia”. Even after a brief acquaintance with the specificity of work of the Islamic republic’s secret services, such charges cause obvious bewilderment. Since the 1990s, Iranian intelligence showed increased interest in the Southern Caucasus, in particular, Azerbaijan. In the neighboring Russian territory they paid certain attention to several areas, adjoining the Caspian Sea, in particular Daghestan and the Astrakhan area. In parallel, in Southern Russia the secret services of Tehran trace the activity of Iranian immigrants, especially those of Azerbaijani origin, and also follow the activity of its traditional opponents – in particular Turkish intelligence. However, the official leadership of Iran, in practice, never supported the Caucasian opponents of the Kremlin. Besides its unwillingness to spoil relations with Moscow, the reason is that Tehran is not interested in the destabilization of the Caucasus. Interethnic and religious conflicts in this region bear a potential threat to the national security of the Islamic republic itself.

Despite the inconsistency of some statements of Russian officials on this issue, during the last two years they have continued to put forward new charges addressing the foreign special services. In August 2004 President of Ingushetia Murat Ziazikov spoke out on this issue on one occasion. In the past he occupied a number of supervisory posts in the FSB structure in the Northern Caucasus, and in the spring of 2002, actively supported by the Kremlin, he headed one of the republics of this region. In an interview to the Russian edition Sovershenno Sekretno, Ziazikov practically accused foreign intelligence of participation in the actions of the Islamic Mujaheeds in Ingushetia in June 2004.

And, finally, the last statement on this issue was declared three months ago. In December 2005, the head of the local department of the FSB of the Stavropol territory (Northern Caucasus) Oleg Dukanov accused the agents of foreign special services of “kindling separatist moods among the inhabitants of the republics of Southern Russia, conducting terrorist acts, destruction of facilities of security bodies and armed forces”. This implied that the intelligence services of the various countries of the world conduct large-scale military actions in the Northern Caucasus. Actually the secret war in this region is conducted mainly between the Russian special services (FSB and military intelligence – GRU), and also between them and the local anti-Russian underground, and, in particular, its counterintelligence structures.

The Hidden Front of Jihad

The report, acquired by the AIA, states: “According to the data for 2005, the Chechen special services have exposed, arrested, or shot 23 agents of the Russian secret services among Chechens. Some of them were re-recruited. Throughout this period of time 6 agents of Russian nationality, 4 Daghestanis, 3 Ingush, 2 Uzbeks, 2 Kabardins, 2 Tatars, 1 Karachai, 1 Ossetian, 1 Bashkirian “were seized or eliminated”.

Accordingly, during the last year the counterespionage of Chechen separatists revealed a total of 45 people suspected of connections with the Russian secret services.

The hunt for agents of the Kremlin started in the Chechen Republic with the coming to power in the republic of supporters of independence in the autumn of 1991. Its first victim was considered to be KGB Major Victor Tolstenev who died in November of the same year. Created soon after that, the National Security Service (SNB) of the republic concentrated its efforts on counteracting the Russian secret services. The head of the SNB, Abusupian Movsaev, declared later: “I perfectly realize that Russia will send its agents to us, to carry out special operations in the territory of the republic. And we shall be engaged from our side in gathering intelligence information, which interests us”. In November 1998 the leadership of then independent Chechnya even created a special commission engaged in legal proceedings in the cases of those inhabitants of the republic who cooperated earlier with the Russian authorities, and first of all with FSB and GRU.

Under the conditions of constant Russian – Chechen confrontation, and especially against a background of military actions in the republic, not infrequent errors of the SNB in revealing the agents of the opposition were inevitable. Many people have been executed on fallacious charges in connection with Moscow’s secret services. However, activity of the Chechen counterespionage had not a few real results. As a rule, any reports on such occasions were interpreted by the Russian authorities as “disinformation” or “provocation”. However, there are known cases when Russian high-ranking officers of secret services were apprehended by Chechens, and that forced the official representatives of the Kremlin to recognize the facts.

The first such case took place several weeks prior to the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, in November 1994. The special services of the Chechen separatists captured a Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Federal service of counterespionage, (the progenitor of the FSB) Stanislav Krylov. He headed the personal guard of one of the leaders of the pro-Russian opposition in the republic. The testimony of the captured officer was shown on Chechen TV, becoming the first real confirmation of the activity of Russian secret services against President Jokhar Dudayev, who did not submit to Moscow.

Less than a year later the Chechens ambushed the present head of Russian military intelligence GRU, Valentin Korabelnikov. At that time he was second in the line of command of this special service and stayed in the Northern Caucasus with a special confidential mission. As a result of the attack, the officer who accompanied him was killed, and Korabelnikov, who received numerous wounds, was lucky to escape capture.

Right at the beginning of the second Chechen campaign, in October 1999, the Chechen separatists captured three high-ranking GRU officers all at once. The leading one was one of the most valuable and professional officers of the military intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Zuriko Ivanov. Before that he participated in military conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and during the first Chechen war he supervised the personal guard of the head of the pro-Russian puppet administration of the republic, Doku Zavgaev. For several months there was no information about Ivanov and his fellow officers’ lot. Only in March 2000 the head of the press-service of the FSB, Alexander Zdanovich, officially declared, that “a group of GRU officials was executed by the Chechens”.

The abovementioned facts are just the most notable cases of this type of event. They came about as a result of secret-service work of the Chechen counterespionage, of the corruption of the Russian security structures, and also of the rivalry between various Moscow secret services. The Chechens quite often effectively used the last two circumstances for their own ends, in particular, which testifies to the cases of Korabelnikov and Ivanov.

In only the first year of the second Chechen campaign, according to Vladimir Putin, the GRU has lost in total more than 400 of its employees. And according to the data of the deputy chief of the FSB, Vyacheslav Ushakov, after the first three years of the second war, over 200 of his subordinates did not return from the Chechen Republic. Such a high level of losses among representatives of the Russian secret services, in many respects, is a result of the secret activity of their Chechen colleagues – opponents. By the way, since 2004, the Kremlin’s official representatives have not ever published data on FSB and GRU losses in Chechnya. The current announcements on these losses, thought, appear in the Russian mass media on a regular basis…

Pavel Simonov, Sami Rozen, AIA

Department of Cooperation and Mass Media,

Kavkaz-Center

2006-04-06 00:42:26

http://www.kavkazcenter.net/eng/content/2006/04/06/4578.shtml

Moscow human rights activists support “Mothers of Dagestan”

Human rights activists are indignant with the attacks on the public organization “Mothers of Dagestan for Human Rights” and plan to do everything to defend it. This is the topic of the statement made at today’s press conference in the Independent Press Centre in Moscow by representatives of the leading human rights organizations of Russia.

“Now, a campaign is on to discredit the organization ‘Mothers of Dagestan for Human Rights’. The campaign is nicely staged. The NGO is ‘flaked’ by federal mass media. The ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ (KP) placed a false publication that they support militants and Wahhabites; the NTV television showed two clips of the same sort. On behalf of the ‘Mothers of Dagestan’, we sent a complaint to the KP and plan to do the same to the NTV. We support this organization, and we shall not let insulting it,” Lev Ponomaryov, leader of the Movement “For Human Rights”, said in the press conference.

Mr Ponomaryov has briefed the journalists on what Dagestan women-human rights defenders are doing: “Relatives of the people kidnapped by power agents address them. They hold public campaigns in defence of these citizens. They managed to save some of them, at least four. Today we have received a message that three persons were released from militia. It quite well can be a reaction to our press conference.”

The meeting with journalists was also attended by Svetlana Isaeva, Chair of the Board of the “Mothers of Dagestan for Human Rights”, Liudmila Alekseeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Alexander Cherkasov, member of the Board of the Human Rights Centre “Memorial“, Svetlana Gannushkina, leader of the Committee “Civil Assistance”, and Nikolai Svanidze, Chairman of the Commission on Interethnic Relations and Freedom Conscience of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation.

Svetlana Isaeva has confirmed that she received today a message about “release of three guys – they are already at home”: “They were under inquiry in the case of Vadim Butdaev. Allegedly, they took part in some community, planning to start jihad with arms in hand. Butdaev was killed in a special operation in the end of last year. The fact that his ‘crime accomplices’ were released without trial is a vivid indication that there was no criminal community whatsoever. However, Vadim was lost. Even his body was not given out to relatives with references to the terrorism legislation, although the court had failed to prove that Vadim was a terrorist.”

See earlier reports: “Activist of “Mothers of Dagestan” challenges detention of her sister Dinara Butdaeva,” ““Mothers of Dagestan” deny contacts with militants,” “Leader of “Dagestan Mothers”: killed Zakaryaev pursued Butdaev.”

From: MSN NicknameEagle_wng  (Original Message)    Sent: 4/12/2006 12:31 PM
“Then Kozak appeared with a sabre”  Adygeya president named cause of his resignation
11.4.2006
As “Kommersant” informed on April 4th, at the session of Adygeya parliament Khazret Sovmen declared his resignation, however later the press-service of the republican leader disavowed his statement. In the interview to “Kommersant” correspondents Diana Dadasheva and Sergey Surzhenko Khazret Sovmen declared that the reason of his resignation became the conflict with the plenipotentiary of the president in the Southern federal district Dmitry Kozak, and let know that he would cancel his decision if it he was supported by the Kremlin administration.

– After the session of Adygeya parliament it’s still not clear: have you submitted your application for resignation or just hinted about such opportunity?

– There were no hints. I have submitted to the parliament my application for resignation, not specifying reasons, by my own will. However then in mass-media deformed information appeared: ostensibly my application was submitted after a part of the deputies of the State Soviet-Khase did not stand up when I came in. It’s not true. Now in Adygeya there is the parliament respecting the president and itself.

– So what is the reason of your decision of resignation?

– To make all the things clear, I shall tell background. I had thought hard about the post of the leader of the republic when in the post-reorganization years in Adygeya they began shooting, people got killed. I had stopped the massacre. And I thought: I go for one year to level the situation. In 2002 we had a flooding. It seems to me, we had adequately solved the problem and restored the infrastructure – we had help for our republic from the other regions delivering in trains. Next year there was a greater drought. I decided that it would be wrong to stand aside as I had come to help people. With the plenipotentiary Kazantsev (Victor Kazantsev held the post of the plenipotentiary of the president in the Southern federal district till March, 2004) we misunderstood each other; I was obstructed then.

When Jakovlev was appointed (Vladimir Jakovlev headed the apparatus of the plenipotentiary till autumn, 2004), we in common planned the plan for development of Adygeya: how to involve investments and to make republic not donated. Then Kozak appeared (Dmitry Kozak – the present plenipotentiary of the president in the Southern federal district) and, swinging with “a sabre”, began to demand to join (Krasnodar territory).

– Is that the reason of your decision – your discontent of the policies of plenipotentiary Kozak?

– The southern federal district as structure has become obsolete. What is this intermediary between the region and the president for? It is supposed that the duties of the SFD management would be to watch that in the subjects laws were observed. However in the case of our republic everything is on the contrary. The plenipotentiary openly speaks to me: in Adygeya the law did not work and will not work. Moreover, he gave the direct instruction to the power structures to obey only his instructions and to ignore decisions of the president of the republic. Our public prosecutor sent to the Southern federal district report about corruption of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Adygeya where he named surnames. And the district answers with that it publicly hands over encouragements and letters to the people mentioned in the public prosecutor’s report. I think for the region – for militia, the Office of Public Prosecutor, the arbitration – one person – its head – should be responsible.

– Has the idea of integration of Krasnodar territory and Adygeya affected your decision on resignation in any way?

– Now the plenipotentiary apparatus tries to attach Adygeya using another’s hands. But they do not understand that it cause tragedy. We have very fragile situation. It is necessary to consider the opinion of the indigenous population of our republic – our and Cossacks’. Instead of some newcomers. I have never known how much our people are proud of the status of Adygeya. And Kozak nevertheless caught the idea of integration and now does not consider the opinion of Adygeyan Diaspora. Diaspora is afraid that the nationality would disappear without the status of republic. I don’t think the idea of the integration lives under will of the governor of Krasnodar territory (Alexander Tkachev). If such idea exists we should work out plans with him. We don’t need the mediator – Dmitry Kozak.

– Your application for resignation is the final decision on leaving the post of the president of Adygeya, isn’t it?

– I was invited on Tuesday to a meeting with Sobjanin (the head of the Kremlin administration Sergey Sobjanin). If I am stated full confidence (as people’s trust I’ve already received) if there is no negative intervention from the Southern federal district, I shall obey the will of people, and everything can change. Because of the management of the SFD the republican budget has lost 12 billion rubles. Investors did not come, including me. I tried to do my best and was the provisional politician. The Ministry of Finance is satisfied with our work. We are the single subject not plundered by the executive authority.

– And how do you find the fact that about 70 percent of supervising posts in the republic are occupied with Adygs, who make minority in Adygeya?

– We have a serious personnel shortage now. If there is a Russian command – there will be a Russian government. As for me I am always for parity observance.

“Kommersant” newspaper

http://www.adygeanatpress.net/stat_e.php?id=1666