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Russian Federation: Ethnic Discrimination in Southern Russia / 3
Ethnic Wars and Forced Migration
Tensions that resulted from the treatment of nationality issues during the Soviet era erupted in violence during “perestroika.” Issues and grievances not discussed for decades found their expression in Kalashnikov fire and salvos of Grad rockets. Between 1987 and 1994 several wars broke out in the former Soviet Union on the borders of or near Krasnodar and Stavropol provinces pitting nationalities against each other. Fighting erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossetia (Georgia), Abkhazia (Georgia), Ingushetia (Russia), the Prigorodny region (North Ossetia), and Chechnya (Russia).[21] Krasnodar and Stavropol and, to a lesser degree, Volgograd provinces became magnets for refugees, IDPs and migrants fleeing these conflicts.[22] They also enjoy a relativelytemperate climate and favorable agricultural conditions compared to other parts of the former Soviet Union. Finally, Stavropol and Krasnodar provinces are home to co-ethnic communities already established in the region, such as Armenians. Provincial governments in Krasnodar and Stavropol responded to the rising influx of refugees, IDPs and economic migrants by handing down restrictions on residence and visitors’ permits; Krasnodar authorities perceive with alarm that current trends threaten ethnic harmony.
A survey of non-Slavic refugees in Krasnodar conducted in 1994 produced the following result: in 1994, 66 percent of non-Russian refugees polled said that they would make every effort to stay in Krasnodar permanently (rather than resettle elsewhere in Russia); in 1990, just 20 percent gave that response.[23] Eighty-three percent said that they wanted to stay permanently, as opposed to 65 percent in 1990.[24] Few Baku Armenians, for example, chose to go to Armenia when they fled, preferring Moscow, Krasnodar, or Stavropol. Many did not even speak Armenian. An Armenian journalist on assignment in Pyatigorsk quipped:
When a portion of the ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan poured into Armenia, then the democratic government of Armenia forced them to leave even Armenia because it was closing Russian-language schools. Many of the Armenian kids studied in such schools in Azerbaijan….Maybe the majority of the Armenians who live here who don’t have a stake in the region would happily return to Armenia, but there are no Russian-language schools [there]. And if I or my children were not taught Russian, how can I go to school? And I can add that the [Armenian] intelligentsia lived in Baku, and in Armenia they only offered rural areas [to live in].[25]
Until 1991, the migration flow was largely unregulated by central authorities, and little aid was given to alleviate the additional strain on social services. There are no exact figures regarding the total in-migration of refugees, IDPs and other forced migrants from 1988 to the present; this population is fluid and often does not report its presence because of fear of abuse or deportation. According to the passport service of the Krasnodar Directorate for Internal Affairs, as of October 1, 1994, there were 184,125 individuals who had come to Krasnodar from “conflict zones” and “zones of unrest,” mostly Russian-speakers [ruskoya zychniy] which usually indicated ethnic Russians, Belorusians, Ukranians in non-Slavic regions of the former Soviet Union (60.6 percent) and Armenians (24.7 percent).[26] By January 1996 this figure had grown to 223,000.[27] Krasnodar administration officials in 1993 claimed that the total number of all migrants, both legal and illegal, was close to 675,000, about 13 percent of the population,a highly controversial figure;[28] in 1996, the Krasnodar government noted that the province had received 12 percent of all “migrants,” presumably including refugees, IDPs and other migrants who had come to Russia.[29] An Armenian leader in Krasnodar, however, told Human Rights Watch in 1996 that as many as 390,000 Armenian refugees may reside unregistered in the province. As noted before, according to the 1989 Soviet census, Krasnodar province (excluding the Adygei Republic located within its territory) had a population of 4.62 million, which grew to almost five million by the end of 1994.
The growth of the ethnic Armenian community has alarmed the Krasnodar provincial government. Its 1996 Regional Migration Program, which sets goals for local migration policy, noted that “considering the…consistent mortality rate of the Slavic population, and given the rise of Armenians [as a percent of population] resulting from the growth in migration…and their natural growth rate, one can speak of a gradual process of changing the historical…balance in the number of major national groups in the province’s population.”[30] The same document warned that the continued rise in the numbers of refugees and IDP would lead to inter-ethnic tensions.[31] A 1997 gubernatorial resolution on violations of residence requirements in the resort city of Sochi repeatedly compares ethnic Russians and ethnic Armenians in statistics regarding residence permits, building permits and the like.[32] The same resolution vilified regional registration officials for the dramatic rise in the number of Armenian “migrants” in Sochi, supposedly in violation of local ordinances and federal law.[33]
The situation is similar in Stavropol province, whose official 1989 population of 2.41 million jumped to 2.65 million by 1995.[34] The head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in Stavropol province reported that IDPs and refugees were not officially registered until July 1, 1992; before that, he estimated, approximately 5,000 to 7,000 IDPs Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh and Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan arrived in Stavropol becauseof communal violence in their homelands.[35] Between 1992 and 1994, another 28,601 IDPs and refugees arrived; many of the IDPs were Russians leaving Chechnya after its declaration of independence. Between December 1994 and May 1995, the head of the FMS estimated, that another 40,000 IDPs arrived, many of them ethnic Russians fleeing the fighting in Chechnya. By April 1996 there were 53,000 legally registered IDPs and refugees in Stavropol, with the total reaching 100,000 if one includes those not registered.[36] If one includes the number of individuals who transited through Stavropol or stayed there temporarily, the numbers reach several hundred thousand.[37]
Officials in both Krasnodar and Stavropol told us they were ill-prepared to meet this wave. At a time when central budgets were in disarray and scant investment was made in social services or infrastructure, Moscow did little to alleviate the problem. Almost all local officials and people we met complained of the burden perceived or actual that migrants and refugees put on the infrastructure. One local official commented:
After the earthquake of 1989 the first Armenians came and we welcomed them with open arms. But after that all the refugees came we were overwhelmed. These people don’t want to go to Siberia, etc. They overcrowded public services, transport, the labor market. You had the same thing in California and the result was a referendum. There has been a diminution of the rights of the local population. People live here, they are not registered, but we don’t get money in our budget from the center for them. The central government in Moscow should distribute them in all of the North Caucasus.[38]
Aleksandr Berdnik, a consultant on nationalities policy to the Stavropol administration, explained:
The whole fact of the matter is that…even before the Soviet Union began to collapse, there were refugees from Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and then Chechnya. These people needed a place to settle down and find housing. Among them were ethnic Russians, from Azerbaijan Armenians fled, from Armenia, Azerbaijanis….In the end result, if you talk about Shpakovskii district, it turned out that in connection with this in-migration of people into the region, in a very short window of time, for example, the number of ethnic Armenians grew substantially….of course the infrastructure started to break down there wasn’t enough housing or stores. The local residents, of course, began to be exasperated. That is why there appeared this temporary decree [of 1994] not to allow the newcomers to register, and all the rest….[39]
The head of the FMS in Stavropol also noted that, “There should be a regulation of migration waves. We were overwhelmed. This is a great place, if we don’t regulate it, we can’t solve any problems such as housing and infrastructure…The region is overpopulated. The kindergartens and hospitals are overwhelmed.”[40]
The survey conducted in Krasnodar in 1994 among both long-term residents and migrants and refugees concluded that, “… Many local residents see the refugees and migrants as guilty parties in their own worsening socio-economic situation, as competition in the labor and housing markets, where they themselves are experiencing some difficulty. And in reality, housing prices in southern Russia are approaching those of Moscow, schools work in three shifts, and you can’t get into a hospital.” [41]
This view is even shared to a certain extent by long-term non-Slavic residents of the region. An Armenian woman in Krasnodar with whom we spoke at the office of the local Armenian community complained:
Krasnodar has the status of a border region. If it didn’t exist, it would have started earlier here than in Chechnya…. Our people are not so civilized that we can abolish the propiska system. I was a member of the propiska commission.[42] The infrastructure will not support everyone. The administration of a territory has the right to protect it. A social explosion was ripening. The administration passed restrictive decrees to calm those who become upset. All those who managed to get a residency permit before March 1992 are Russian citizens….One has to make a decision either a citizen of Russia or go to Armenia.[43]
Another Armenian admitted that, “There was a period when long-time Armenian residents here reacted badly toward the refugees.”[44]
The ethnic solidarity networks that migrants often use to settle and find work also disturbs the Slavic population, which sees something “conspiratorial” or “illegal” in this. The study conducted in 1994 reported that 75 percent of non-Slavic refugees used the help of relatives or friends in getting settled, up from 11 percent in 1990.[45] A local official in Timashevsk, a district of Krasnodar, told us that,
You have to look closely at these individuals of Caucasian ancestry. The first wave were Armenians from Armenia: They came from their own land. They fit into our way of life. But the rest of the Caucasians from Georgia, from Azerbaijan, were people who had already worked out a system of self-survival and opposition in a foreign sphere, i.e. were minorities. Here they are trying to approach the local population with the same standards. An extended family comes, with many adults, they buy a lot of homes next to each other. They make it so that the home is purchased by relatives and family. Then they close it all off with a fence and create their own little world.[46]
The head of the Armenian community in Stavropol, who has lived there thirty years, told us that, “It all depends on the concentration of people. One Armenian family in a village, everything is okay. If one-third of the population becomes Armenian, there are problems.”[47]
Even though the majority of those officially registered are of Slavic ethnicity, non-Slavs seem to be singled out for the brunt of hostility towards migrants and refugees. In Stavropol, about 80 percent of forced migrants are ethnic Russians.[48] In Krasnodar, the figure is about the same.[49] Most of those not officially registered as refugees and forced migrants appear to be non-Slavs. A poll conducted in Krasnodar among long-term residents showed that more than 50 percent of respondents believe that preference should be given to ethnically Slavic migrants.[50]
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