Paul Goble’s 50 Windows on Eurasia / February 19, 2023

Paul Goble’s 50 Windows on Eurasia / February 19, 2023

1.     Putin’s is ‘the Imperialism of Idiots,’ Dilmukhametov Says  

2.     Dastans, Epic Stories about Resistance to Outsiders, Now Being Promoted in Tatarstan

3.     Moscow Allows Russian Gas Company to Set Up a PMC in the Arctic\

4.     Aging Housing Stock, Not Ukrainian Agents, Behind Growing Wave of Gas Explosions in Russian Apartment Blocks, Experts Say  

5.     Moscow’s Influence in South Caucasus Declining toward ‘Point of No Return,’ Armenian Scholars Say  

6.     Moscow Counts Georgia and Moldova as ‘Relatively Friendly’ Countries to Maintain Its View that ‘Post-Soviet Space’ Remains Vital  

7.     Promethean Agenda Can Prevent Reemergence of Muscovite Imperialism, Mamulia Says  

8.     Tatars Declined by Only Half as Many as Russian Census Reports, New Analysis Shows  

9.     Kazakhstan’s Other Nationality Problem: Non-Russian Non-Kazakh Nations Almost as Numerous as Ethnic Russians There  

10.  Despite Pandemic’s End, Russia had More Deaths than Births for Fifth Straight Year in 2022  

11.  Putin Reversing Hard-Won Gains by Non-Russians in Republic Governments  

12.  Unlike in the Caucasus, Intellectuals in Kazakhstan Failed to Promote Kazakh Language in Last Decades of Soviet Power, Zhanabergen Says  

13.  ‘Putin is Too Soft,’ Aleksandrov Says, because with a Tougher Leader, Moscow would Already Control the Entire Former Soviet Space  

14.  Fewer Russians Say They Want to Emigrate Now than Did a Year Ago, Surveys Find

15.   To Avoid Dictatorship or Disintegration, Russia Must Become a Parliamentary Republic without a President, Khodorkovsky Says  

16.  Kremlin Unwittingly Provides Guide to Remaining Independent Media, Print and Online, in Moscow, the Regions and Republics  

17.  Key Division among Prisoners in Russia Today Not between Political and Ordinary but between Those who Get Public Attention and Those who Don’t, Solidarity Zone Activists Say  

18.  Russia’s Censorship Agency Maintains List of Words No One Must Call Putin or Link to Him  

19.  Despite Criticism, Public Opinion Polls Remain a Reliable Source on Public Attitudes, Volkov Says

20.  New Title for Kadyrov Very Different Thing than New Title for Tatarstan Head, Makarkin Says  

21.  Snitching Coming Back So Strongly Because It Allows Russians to Engage in Conflict without Doing So in the Open, Roshchin Says  

22.  Russian Policies Radicalizing Circassian Young People, Taynalova Says  

23.  Putin’s Russia Now More Repressive than Brezhnev’s Soviet Union Was, Arrests and Convictions Show  

24.  Moscow’s Obsession with Russian Emigration Only Intensifying  

25.  Moscow Sees No Chance for Introduction of EU or UN Peacekeepers in Qarabagh  

26.  Belarus has Just Made Moscow’s Task of Attracting Emigres Back Far More Difficult

27.  Kumyk Activist Wants Non-Russians to Launch a ‘Black Lives Matter’-Style Movement against Liberals and Putin Regime  

28.  Ethnic Russians Lead Downward Trend in Births, Rosstat Figures Show  

29.  Russian boys Now Dream of Becoming Wagner Mercenaries and Girls of Becoming Military Widows, Not Bandits and Prostitutes as was the Case in the 1990s  

30.  ‘In Seeking to Correct “Greatest Geopolitical Catastrophe of the 20th Century,” Putin Triggering ‘Greatest Ethno-Social Crisis of the 21st,’ Inozemtsev Says  

31.  Recognition Growing that Russia’s Survival Entails Greater Risk than Its Demise, Eidman Says  

32.  Having Stripped Borderlands of Troops for His War in Ukraine, Putin May have Lowered Threshold for Going Nuclear, Norwegian Intelligence Service Says   

33.  Denunciations Gives Russian Marginals a Chance to Feel They’re Listened to and Another Reason to Support Putin, Kolesnikov Says  

34.  Russia’s Buddhists as Deeply Divided on War in Ukraine as Those of Other Faiths, ‘Lyudi Baikala’ Says  

35.  Charging Putin with War Crimes Now Could Eventually Affect Russians, Gudkov Says  

36.  Many Russian Residents Told Census They Don’t Identify by Nationality ‘On Principle,’ Rosstat Deputy Head Says  

37.  Ethnic Russian Regions have More ‘Disloyal’ Media Outlets than Non-Russian Republics Do, Moscow Censorship Agency Says  

38.  Kremlin Ranks Managing Inter-Ethnic Relations as Its Third Most Important Task, Semigin Says

39.  Munich Security Conference Invites Russian Liberals but Not Regionalists or Non-Russian Nationalists  

40.  Daghestan Deeply Divided on War in Ukraine

41.  Given War in Ukraine, Putin Now Moves about Russia by Armored Train rather than Plane

42.  Russians Getting ‘Used to War’ and that is Dangerous for All Involved, Eidelman Says  

43.  Putin Regime Arose Because Russian Democrats in 1990s Betrayed the People, Zharkov Says  

44.  Émigré-Founded Ingushetia Independence Committee has Support at Home and Authorities are Unwittingly Spreading Its Influence  

45.  Putin Promoting ‘Festivalization of Nationality Policy,’ Berezhkov Says  

46.  Putin Followed Stalin’s Path but has Now Turned into a Pale ‘Copy of Hitler,’ Nevzlin Says  

47.  What’s the Russian for ‘Human Rights?’ Muscovites Ask

48.  Only Some Unexpected Catastrophe Could Allow Regions and Republics to Gain Independence from Moscow, Golosov Says  

49.  Declining Numbers of Ukrainians in Occupied Crimea Reflects Re-Identification rather than Outmigration, Russian Official Says

50.  Dying Out of Finno-Ugric Languages in Russian Federation Not a Natural Process but a State-Promoted One, Pasanen Says

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